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INTRODUCTION 
 
A century ago, Roscoe Pound set forth his agenda for a “sociological 
jurisprudence”1 that would study the “actual social effects of legal institu-
tions and legal doctrines.”2 Pound sought to use empirical social science to 
advance normative goals: he “regard[ed] law as a social institution which 
may be improved by intelligent human effort” and proposed that social 
science could “discover the best means of furthering and directing such 
effort.”3 Two decades later, Karl Llewellyn issued his call for a “realistic 
jurisprudence” that would use empirical social science to study the determi-
nants and consequences of judicial decisions.4 Llewellyn was also motivated 
by normative ends, believing that in order to investigate whether the “law 
does what it ought,” one must “first answer what it is doing now.”5 Pound 
and Llewellyn sparred over their respective visions,6 but it is important to 
remember that they shared a common aim: to use empirical social science to 
improve the law.  
The early legal empiricists were mindful of the challenges of connecting 
positive and normative approaches to legal scholarship. In his exchange with 
Pound, Llewellyn famously called for a “temporary divorce of Is and 
Ought.”7 He believed that the separation of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ was necessary 
for scientific credibility, but that it must be temporary in order to serve the 
 
1 See Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1-3), 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 591 (1911); 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912); 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, 
Scope and Purpose]. 
2 Pound, Scope and Purpose (pt. 3), supra note 1, at 513. 
3 Id. at 516. 
4 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 
(1930). 
5 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1223 (1931). 
6 See id. at 1226-33; Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 
(1931); Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 433-35. 
7 Llewellyn, supra note 5, at 1236. 
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goals of legal reform.8 In the years that followed, however, legal empiricists 
struggled to balance the competing demands of social science and legal 
reform.9 Some failed to separate ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ allowing their normative 
commitments to influence their factual findings.10 Others failed to reunite 
‘is’ and ‘ought,’ producing “a mindless amassing of statistics without 
reference to any guiding theory whatsoever.”11 Years later, a disillusioned 
Llewellyn mocked his fellow realists for their pointless empirical projects.12 
He wrote: “I read all the results, but I never dug out what most of the 
counting was good for.”13 
 The early legal empiricists had worthy ambitions, but their accomplish-
ments were meager.14 There were many reasons for their failure,15 but 
prominent among them was their inability to develop any kind of theoreti-
cal framework for making their empirical findings relevant to normative 
 
8 See id. at 1236-37 (arguing that “during the inquiry itself into what Is, the observation, the 
description, and the establishment of relations between the things described are to remain as 
largely as possible uncontaminated by the desires of the observer,” but that for those “who begin 
with a suspicion that change is needed, a permanent divorce would be impossible”). 
9 See, e.g., John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the 
Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459, 539-45 (1979) (discussing the struggles faced by legal 
realists at Yale Law School in balancing the methodological imperatives of social science with the 
demands of progressive reform). 
10 See id. at 540-45 (describing how several of the realists, most notably William O. Douglas, 
abandoned the scientific method when it conflicted with their reform objectives). 
11 S.N. Verdun-Jones, Cook, Oliphant, and Yntema: The Scientific Wing of American Legal Real-
ism, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 43 (1979). 
12 See Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 399, 
401 (1956) (describing studies by Walter Wheeler Cook and Herman Oliphant as “hastily 
considered, ill-planned, mal-prepared . . . so-called research” and a study by Underhill Moore as 
“the nadir of idiocy”). 
13 Id. at 403.  
14 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 158 (1995) (“Legal real-
ists made a good deal of fuss about bringing social sciences to the law schools. But they did 
disappointingly little with such sciences once they had got them there.”); MORTON HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960 210 (1992) (“Virtually all [legal 
historians] agree that most of the social science research projects undertaken by Realists were 
either trivial attempts to prove the obvious through pseudo-scientific methodology or else naive 
and misconceived efforts at social science research.”); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, 
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 205 
(1943) (describing the realists’ empirical scholarship as producing “isolated and trivial results”); 
Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 
330 (1989) (noting that many of the early empiricists “regarded [their] projects largely as 
failures”). 
15 See Schlegel, supra note 9, at 460 (“[T]he Realists’ social scientific research died out be-
cause of the impermanence of the institutionalized circumstances in which it was undertaken, the 
peculiarities of the personalities of the leaders of the undertaking, and the difficulties in matching 
the impulse to do such research with the social science of the time.”). 
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legal scholarship.16 Today, empirical legal scholarship is flourishing 
again,17 and contemporary empiricists are far more sophisticated than their 
predecessors. Many law professors now have advanced social science 
training18 and employ sophisticated methodologies from other disciplines to 
analyze and interpret data. Like the early empiricists, however, they are still 
struggling to balance the methodological imperatives of social science with 
the desire for legal reform. Often, the quest for scientific credibility leads 
contemporary empiricists to lose sight of the normative goals of legal 
scholarship. Some empirical studies make efforts to relate their findings to 
normative questions about law, and some even offer policy prescriptions, 
but such studies rarely explain how they derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Even 
a cursory examination of the premises underlying such claims often reveals 
them to be untenable.  
Empirical research projects need not generate immediate prescriptions, 
but even positive legal research should address topics that have some 
importance for legal scholarship. Because the law is a normative practice 
and exists to serve social purposes, determining what is important in legal 
scholarship requires some reference to the normative goals of law.19 Thus, 
any empirical research that purports to be relevant to legal scholarship 
requires some framework for connecting ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ 
 
16 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 19 (1995) (“The empirical projects of the 
legal realists, which not only failed but in failing gave empirical research rather a bad name among 
legal academics, illustrate the futility of empirical investigation severed from a theoretical 
framework.”); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 234 (1995) (describing the lack of “conceptual schema that could explain the results of 
the Realist’s research”); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 311-12 (1997) (arguing that the problem with realism was not the lack of a 
theoretical framework, but “rather adherence to a bad theoretical framework”); Llewellyn, supra 
note 12, at 401 (“There was a rich and reeking failure . . . in finding ideas or words of common 
ground to translate legal problems or phenomena into meaningfulness to the social disciplines or 
to interpret social discipline concepts or methods into anything with meaning and appeal to men 
of law.”); Verdun-Jones, supra note 11, at 43 (describing the failure of legal realists “to establish 
even the most rudimentary conceptual framework capable of ordering empirical information into a 
meaningful form”). 
17 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 581, 590-91 (2010) (noting the growth of empirical scholarship in law 
reviews between 1998 and 2008); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 147 (2006) (documenting the increased use of 
empirical terms in law review articles between 1994 and 2006); Michael Heise, An Empirical 
Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production, 1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1741-46 
(documenting growth in empirical terms in law review titles). 
18 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education, 8 
REV. L. & ECON. 487, 489 (2012) (reporting that 20% of faculty members at the 26 highest-ranked 
law schools have a Ph.D. in a social science discipline). 
19 See infra Section V.A. 
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As Barry Friedman has prominently argued, empirical legal scholars 
should “ask, at the outset of every project, why we . . . might care about 
what is being studied.”20 Yet it is not enough to admonish legal empiricists 
to pay more attention to normative implications. In many settings, there are 
complex relationships between the phenomena that are readily measured 
and the values that can justify legal reform. Intuition alone cannot suffice to 
relate observable data to normative claims; legal scholarship needs concep-
tual frameworks and empirical methods that can bridge the gap between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought.’ Developing such frameworks will require a sustained agenda 
that integrates empirical methodology with legal theory. 
Part I of this Article begins by considering how other disciplines have 
developed methods for relating quantitative empirical findings to normative 
claims. Typically, this is accomplished by formulating a normative metric 
that quantifies the goodness of the results. Using medicine and economics 
as examples, Part I shows how scholars in these disciplines have developed 
frameworks and methods for connecting the positive and the normative. 
Empirical legal scholars, by contrast, often seek normative relevance by 
examining measureable phenomena that have some intuitive but only 
vaguely specified connection to a normative goal. Many studies simply 
conflate the measureable with the good, justifying policy proposals on the 
basis of the measureable objects. Parts II–IV provide illustrations of this 
approach for three commonly discussed judicial statistics. Part II focuses on 
judicial citation counts, Part III examines reversal rates, and Part IV 
critiques measures of interjudge disparity. These statistics are often used in 
empirical legal scholarship to capture conceptions of good judicial deci-
sionmaking, and all three have been used to justify bold policy proposals.  
For example, scholars have argued that judicial citation counts should be 
used to determine a shortlist for Supreme Court nominations,21 to assess the 
merits of judicial selection procedures,22 to determine whether judges are 
 
20 Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 262 (2006). 
21 See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 299, 300 
(2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament] (proposing a citation count–based system for 
evaluating judges “where the reward to the winner is elevation to the Supreme Court”); Stephen 
J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge 
Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 34 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking] 
(explaining how judicial citation counts can be used to select Supreme Court nominees). 
22 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an 
Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 326 (2008) (using citation 
counts to compare the performance of appointed and elected state court judges). 
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overpaid,23 and even to examine whether men or women make better 
judges.24 Studies documenting interjudge disparities played a prominent 
role in the enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines25 and 
have also been used to justify reforms in Social Security26 and immigration 
adjudication.27 Reversal rates have been cited in debates about whether to 
split the Ninth Circuit28 and used to appraise reforms in immigration 
adjudication.29 Because such measures lack intrinsic normative force, 
however, policy arguments based on these measures alone are untenable. 
These measures may well have some relevance to normative concerns, but 
the studies are seldom explicit about their normative goals, how the data 
relate to these goals, and what premises are needed to justify the conclu-
sions.  
Part V discusses ways that legal empiricists can bridge the gap between 
‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Most fundamentally, legal empiricists need to prioritize 
normative questions; research should focus on what is important, not what 
is easily measureable. In addition, empiricists need to rethink some aspects 
of empirical legal methodology. The choice of methods should be driven by 
questions, not the other way around. Empiricists should not try to seek 
objective, assumption-free conclusions, but rather should indicate how 
findings can be combined with assumptions to generate meaningful conclu-
sions. Finally, due to the nature of the questions that arise in legal scholar-
ship and the limits of experimentation, legal scholars should pay more 
attention to how their findings can generalize to new settings. 
 
23 Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary De-
bate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 67 (2009) (using citation counts to measure the impact of salaries on 
judicial performance). 
24 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504, 508 (2011) 
(using citation counts to assess whether men or women make better judges). 
25 See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104-12 (1998) (describing how empirical studies of sentencing 
disparity played a prominent role in the enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines). 
26 See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISA-
BILITY CLAIMS 22 (1983) (discussing reports that advocated reforms to address the failure of the 
Social Security Administration “to manage the adjudication of claims in ways that produce 
predictable and consistent outcomes”). 
27 See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 295, 325-49 (2007) (documenting wide disparities among immigration judges in asylum 
grant rates); id. at 378-89 (weighing various reforms for reducing the disparities). 
28 See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 120-123 and accompanying text. 
  
2013] Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ 123 
 
I. RELATING THE MEASURABLE TO THE GOOD 
Empirical research is inherently descriptive, yet legal scholarship is pre-
dominantly normative.30 Bridging the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ therefore 
requires some form of normative premise. When empirical legal scholars 
seek to relate their empirical findings to normative claims about the law or 
legal institutions, however, their claims often have vague, unstated founda-
tions. There is frequently a striking contrast between the effort devoted to 
making credible statistical inferences and the lax attitude toward articulat-
ing premises that can connect empirical findings to normative claims about 
law. 
The challenge of relating empirical findings to normative claims is hard-
ly unique to legal scholarship. Many professional disciplines and applied 
sciences—such as medicine, engineering, education, and environmental 
studies—harness scientific knowledge in the pursuit of social purposes. 
Although most empirical research in the social science disciplines is posi-
tive, the research questions of these disciplines are similarly motivated by 
normative ends. 
This Part discusses the use of normative metrics in disciplines other 
than law. In some settings, the relevant metrics are directly measureable, 
and the results are self-interpreting. This part then examines frameworks 
for connecting ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in medical research and in economics, which 
use more sophisticated theories and methods to relate empirical findings to 
normative goals. In contrast to law, scholars in these disciplines are explicit 
about how empirical findings are used to support normative claims.  
A.  Normative Metrics 
In quantitative studies, a normative premise is typically formulated in 
terms of a metric that maps states of the world into levels of goodness. A 
function f would constitute an normative metric if f(A) > f(B) whenever 
state A is preferred over state B. In economics, for example, the function f 
typically represents economic surplus or some conception of social welfare. 
Similarly, research on criminal justice might evaluate policing policies in 
terms of crime rates,31 medical researchers examine health outcomes and 
 
30 Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 
1847 (1988) (“[T]he most distinctive feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive 
voice.”). 
31 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Po-
lice on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 (1997) ( f inding that an increase in the size of police forces 
reduces violent crime). 
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survival rates,32 and education research often examines academic achieve-
ment.33 
Any policy claim derived from an empirical study is only as credible as 
the normative metric that is employed. Justifying a metric requires two 
steps. First, one needs a theory of the good. For example, the metrics 
described above are premised on the desirability of low crime, economic 
efficiency, good health, or academic achievement. These normative premises 
are uncontroversial, even if there might be disagreement about how 
tradeoffs should be made among competing goals.  
Second, one needs to relate observable phenomena to the measure of 
goodness. When good or bad outcomes are directly measurable—such as 
when the outcomes of a medical trial are “survival” and “death”—the results 
will be self-interpreting and no deeper theory is needed. If such a trial is 
well controlled, simple statistical methods may be adequate to assess the 
impact of a treatment and to justify prescriptive claims.  
In many settings, however, the normative metric will not be directly 
measureable, but rather must be inferred from other observable variables. In 
these settings, more complex inferential methods and deeper theories are 
needed to justify normative claims. The following Sections will discuss 
concepts and methods that other disciplines have developed to relate 
measureable outcomes to normative claims. 
B.  Medical Research 
Medicine is a prominent example of a discipline that is both scientific 
and prescriptive. Medical research uses scientific methods to examine the 
effects of various treatments, but the practice of medicine has explicit 
normative goals: the “diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease.”34 
Thus, the commonly accepted metrics for evaluating medical treatments are 
outcomes that represent “how a patient feels, functions, or survives.”35  
 
32 See, e.g., Biomarkers Definitions Working Group, Biomarkers and Surrogate Endpoints: Pre-
ferred Definitions and Conceptual Framework, 69 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 
89, 91 (2001) (defining a “[c]linical endpoint . . . used in the assessment of the benefits and risks 
of a therapeutic intervention” as “[a] characteristic or variable that reflects how a patient feels, 
functions, or survives”). 
33 See, e.g., Cecilia Elena Rouse, Private School Vouchers and Student Achievement: An Evalua-
tion of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, 113 Q.J. ECON. 553 (1998) (examining the impact of 
assignment to a private school on test scores in the context of a school voucher program). 
34 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1087 (3d ed. 2010). 
35 Robert Temple, Are Surrogate Markers Adequate to Assess Cardiovascular Disease Drugs?, 282 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 790, 790 (1999). 
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When these outcomes are directly measureable, the normative implica-
tions of a medical trial may be obvious. Often, however, these normatively 
relevant outcomes cannot be readily measured, especially when the effects 
of a treatment may not accrue until many years after the treatment is 
administered. In such trials, medical researchers often use “surrogate 
outcomes” to proxy for the clinically meaningful outcomes. For instance, 
when the effect of a drug regimen on heart disease and life expectancy 
might not be observed for many years, a study might examine whether the 
drug regimen significantly reduces levels of blood cholesterol. Here, blood 
cholesterol is a surrogate; it has no normative significance beyond its 
tendency to promote coronary disease.  
In this example, a treatment cannot be justified merely on the basis of 
its estimated effect on cholesterol levels. To justify an intervention, any 
surrogate measure must be validated by showing that an effect of the 
treatment on the surrogate will correspond to an effect on a meaningful 
clinical outcome. Validation of the surrogate measure requires two steps. 
First, one must specify the clinical outcome that the surrogate is intended 
to measure, such as survival, comfort, or functional capacity.36 Second, one 
must explain the relationship between the surrogate and the clinical out-
come and show how inferences about the former can facilitate inferences 
about the latter. This step requires both a statistical association between the 
surrogate and the clinical outcome and an understanding of the causal 
relationship between the two. 
Biostatisticians have developed a rich literature on the use of surrogate 
measures, providing a variety of complex conditions under which surrogates 
can be used to support inferences about true outcomes.37 In particular, 
correlation between the surrogate and the true measure is not sufficient to 
justify the use of a surrogate in a clinical trial.38 Often, there may be 
multiple causal pathways between a disease and a true clinical outcome, 
only one of which is captured by the surrogate measure. In such a situation, 
 
36 See id.  
37 See, e.g., Marc Buyse & Geert Molenberghs, Criteria for the Validation of Surrogate End-
points in Randomized Experiments, 54 BIOMETRICS 1014, 1014-16 (1998) (discussing criteria for the 
proper use of surrogates in clinical studies); Thomas R. Fleming & David L. DeMets, Surrogate 
End Points in Clinical Trials: Are We Being Misled?, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 605, 605-06 
(1996) (same); Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Operational 
Criteria, 8 STAT. MED. 431, 431-32 (1989) (same). See generally THE EVALUATION OF SURROGATE 
ENDPOINTS (Tomasz Burzykowski et al. eds., 2005) (discussing the use and validation of 
surrogates in a variety of contexts). 
38 See Stuart G. Baker & Barnett S. Kramer, A Perfect Correlate Does Not a Surrogate Make, 3 
BMC MED. RES. METHODOLOGY, no. 16, 2003, at 2-3 (“[P]erfect correlation does not guarantee 
correct inference when a potential surrogate endpoint replaces a true endpoint.”). 
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measuring the impact of a treatment on the surrogate will fail to capture the 
impact of the treatment on the true outcome.39 
For example, it would be infeasible to measure the effectiveness of 
youth anti-smoking programs by examining the proportion of treated youth 
who die prematurely from lung cancer. Researchers might instead use 
subsequent smoking behavior as a surrogate for premature lung cancer 
death.40 Similarly, reduction in tumor size might be a valid surrogate for 
survival rates in estimating the impact of chemotherapy regimens on lung 
cancer patients. Both cigarette smoking and tumor size are highly correlated 
with lung cancer deaths, and both have a direct causal impact. But smoking 
rates could not be used as a surrogate for measuring the effectiveness of 
chemotherapy, and tumor size could not be used as a surrogate for anti-
smoking campaigns.41 
In a number of instances, drugs have been approved on the basis of their 
effect on surrogate measures but were subsequently discovered to have 
harmful effects on clinical outcomes.42 As these experiences show, the 
relationship between surrogates and meaningful outcomes cannot simply be 
asserted, but must be carefully scrutinized. Understanding the causal 
relationship between medical interventions, surrogates, and clinically 
meaningful outcomes is essential to the validation of any surrogate measure. 
C.  Economics 
Economics, like many of the social sciences, combines positive research 
with normative goals. Economists study the production, consumption, and 
distribution of goods and services, but scholarship in economics is not 
merely motivated by idle curiosity about producers, consumers, and mar-
kets. Rather, the study of economics is motivated by an understanding that 
economic activity serves social purposes and that certain policies may 
advance or hinder those purposes. 
Empirical economists often have access to voluminous data on prices 
and levels of output for goods in various markets. Such data, however, 
typically have no intrinsic normative significance; one would not justify a 
 
39 See Fleming & DeMets, supra note 37, at 605-06 (illustrating how a surrogate endpoint 
might not reflect a true clinical outcome). 
40 See Prentice, supra note 37, at 432-33. Smoking rates also have independent normative 
validity because many people find smoking to be distasteful, but the health effects of tobacco use 
are the primary motivation for anti-smoking campaigns.  
41 Id. 
42 See Fleming & Demets, supra note 37, at 607-08 (discussing how several heart medica-
tions, which were approved by the FDA on the basis of their impact on surrogate measures, were 
subsequently found to increase mortality in clinical trials). 
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policy merely on the basis of its tendency to affect prices or output levels. 
Unlike in medicine, there typically are not measureable phenomena that can 
be used as surrogates for economic wellbeing. To assess the desirability of 
outcomes, economists have formulated concepts such as consumer and 
producer surplus, which represent the gains from trade in a market.43  
Note that surplus is a purely abstract concept, with no analog in the nat-
ural world. It is defined by reference to supply and demand curves, which 
represent the quantities producers would supply and consumers would 
demand at various counterfactual prices. Surplus, supply curves, and 
demand curves cannot be physically measured, but rather must be estimated 
by combining data on prices and output levels at different points in time 
with theoretical assumptions about consumer and producer behavior.  
Because the framework for relating observable data to surplus is so well 
established,44 economists do not need to revisit its fundamentals every time 
they evaluate a proposed policy. Indeed, it can be easy to overlook the 
assumptions underlying any calculation of surplus.45 Nevertheless, the 
concept of surplus allows economists to organize data on prices and output 
levels into a measure of economic wellbeing that can assess the impact of 
various policies and provide justification for proposed reforms. 
D.  Empirical Legal Scholarship 
In contrast to medicine and economics, legal scholarship lacks frame-
works for connecting empirical findings to normative claims. Occasionally, 
when legal changes can be assessed in terms of outcomes that have direct 
normative significance, there is no need for sophisticated theory. For 
example, in studies that examine the impact of tort reforms on medical 
 
43 Economists often use more sophisticated measures of wellbeing as well, in part because 
measures of surplus do not account for distributional impact. For simplicity, I focus on surplus in 
the current discussion. 
44 The concepts of consumer and producer surplus were popularized by the economist Al-
fred Marshall in 1890. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 175 (1890) 
(defining consumer surplus); id. at 428 (defining producer surplus). 
45 See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 251-52 (7th 
ed. 2006) (showing that the definition of consumer surplus depends upon the assumption that 
consumers have quasilinear utility functions); Charles F. Manski, Monotone Treatment Response, 65 
ECONOMETRICA 1311, 1315-16 (1997) (noting that supply and demand functions are often assumed 
to be linear as a matter of convenience and that this assumption is not motivated by economic 
theory). 
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complications in childbirth46 or the effect of school desegregation decisions 
on black dropout rates,47 the normative significance of the outcomes is clear.  
At other times, frameworks from other disciplines are sufficient to eval-
uate outcomes. For example, studies that evaluate the impact of school 
finance decisions on academic achievement may use test scores as outcome 
variables.48 Similarly, studies may use economic concepts to appraise the 
welfare impacts of proposed mergers.49 
The methods of the other disciplines are most likely to be adequate 
when the outcomes of interest are similar to those that arise in the other 
disciplines. If one views law purely as a means to achieve policy goals, then 
the methods of the social sciences can often be used with little adaptation. 
Studies such as those discussed above only need to comprehend law well 
enough to understand the timing and expected impact of legal changes. 
Such studies, however, are conducted from an external point of view; one 
does not need to take any position on the validity of legal events in order to 
appraise them from a policy perspective.50  
Some empirical legal research, however, appears to be motivated by val-
ues internal to law. Although these values are rarely made explicit, such 
studies appear to be animated by concerns about deciding cases correctly, 
treating likes alike, or writing good judicial opinions. Such concepts are not 
 
46 See Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Out-
comes, 123 Q.J. ECON. 795, 801-04 (2008) (measuring the effects of joint-and-several liability and 
damage caps on childbirth complications). 
47 See Jonathan Guryan, Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 919 
(2004). 
48 See, e.g., William J. Glenn, School Finance Adequacy Litigation and Student Achievement: A 
Longitudinal Analysis, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 247, 249 (2009) (“Generally, measuring student outcomes 
entails using test scores.”); Thomas A. Downes, Evaluating the Impact of School Finance Reform on 
the Provision of Public Education: The California Case, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 405, 414 (1992) (“There is 
little evidence that outcomes, as measured by test scores, were less unequal after the school finance 
reforms of the late 1970’s.”). 
49 See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analy-
sis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples, 13 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 265, 270-72 (2006) (discussing alternative 
approaches to measuring lost consumer surplus due to a proposed merger). 
50 This is not to deny that these studies are important to policymakers or to legal scholars. 
Such research is clearly relevant to legislators and administrators, and many contemporary judges 
and scholars accept that judges do and should consider the policy consequences of their decisions. 
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION 18 (2006) (arguing that “judges, in applying a text in light of its purpose, should look to 
consequences, including ‘contemporary conditions, social, industrial, and political, of the community 
to be affected’”); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 
(1921) (arguing that it is sometimes appropriate for judges to act like legislators); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78-91 (2009) (describing judges as “occasional legislators”). 
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directly measurable, however, and the methods of the social sciences are 
often inadequate for connecting measureable outcomes to these concepts.  
Developing methods for evaluating the effects of legal rules and institu-
tions according to criteria internal to law ought to be a priority for legal 
empiricists. Influential theorists such as Ronald Dworkin,51 Joseph Raz,52 
and John Rawls53 have argued that institutions should be evaluated by their 
tendency to protect rights and promote justice.54 Many debates about 
interpretive methods focus on their tendency to promote accurate interpre-
tation, substantive justice, and the rule of law.55 And the Supreme Court’s 
administrative due process jurisprudence evaluates procedures according to 
their “capacity for accurate factfinding and appropriate application of 
substantive legal norms to the facts as found.”56  
The fundamental challenge is that such internal values cannot be direct-
ly measured. Instead of developing theories that can relate observable data 
to these values, as scholars have done in medical research and in economics, 
empirical studies in law often substitute proxy variables that have some 
asserted but unspecified connection to the motivating values. Parts II–IV  
examine three such measures—citation counts, reversal rates, and interjudge 
 
51 See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 34 (1999) (“I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a proce-
dure-driven standard for deciding [institutional questions]. The best institutional structure is the 
one best calculated to produce the best answers to the essentially moral question of what the 
democratic conditions actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those conditions.”). 
52 See Joseph Raz, Disagreement in Politics, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 45 (1998) (“A natural way to 
proceed is to assume that the enforcement of fundamental rights should be entrusted to whichever 
political decision-procedure is, in the circumstances of the time and place, most likely to enforce 
them well, with the fewest adverse side effects.”). 
53 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 230 (1971) (“[T]he fundamental criterion for 
judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results.”). 
54 Others, most notably Jeremy Waldron, reject the view that consequences are dispositive 
for questions of institutional design. See WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 252-54 (2001) 
(critiquing rights-instrumentalism).  
55 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 66-67 (2006) (advocating formalism on the ground that it 
results in fewer errors); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory 
Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 674-84 (1999) (arguing that canons of interpretation should 
be appraised according to their tendency to promote democratic values, the rule of law, and other 
substantive normative goals); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 918 (2003) (arguing that formalism should be evaluated by its tendency to 
avoid “mistakes and injustices”); Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 636, 656-57 (1999) (arguing that formalism should be evaluated according to its 
tendency to avoid inaccuracy and uncertainty in judicial decisionmaking and to provide good ex 
ante incentives). 
56 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. 
REV. 885, 895 (1981). 
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disparities—that empirical scholars commonly use to evaluate judges and 
legal institutions. Each of these outcome measures has an intuitive rele-
vance to a normative goal, but the relationship is vague and under-
theorized. Because scholars are rarely explicit about the relationship be-
tween these measures and the intended measure of merit—indeed, the 
measure of merit is rarely defined—the empirical evidence cannot justify 
the normative claims.  
II.  JUDICIAL CITATION COUNTS 
In a series of recent articles, Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and various 
coauthors have advocated the use of quantifiable metrics to address norma-
tive questions about judicial appointment, promotion, retention, and 
compensation. They have argued that nominations to the Supreme Court 
should be determined on the basis of three empirical indicators: citation 
counts, the number of opinions authored, and the rate at which judges 
disagree with colleagues of the same political party.57 Using these measures 
in a series of studies, they found evidence that “female judges . . . perform 
better than male judges”58 and that “elected judges are superior to appointed 
judges.”59 The authors also used these same performance measures to 
estimate the effects of judicial compensation, finding that “it is as likely that 
judges are overpaid as that they are underpaid.”60 
These authors were not the first to apply a quantitative analysis to the 
study of judicial citations. As early as 1936, one study tabulated the number 
of citations to each state’s courts from other state courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court.61 The goals of the early citation studies, however, were 
purely descriptive. Scholars typically characterized citation counts as a 
measure of influence but did not use them to justify prescriptive claims. At 
times, these measures were given normative interpretations; for example, 
Judge Richard Posner claimed that Learned Hand’s citation counts con-
firmed that he “was indeed a great judge.”62 But until recently, no one 
argued that these measures should guide judicial appointments or the design 
of legal institutions. 
 
57 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 305-13; Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, 
supra note 21, at 50-67. 
58 Choi et al., supra note 24, at 505 (emphasis added). 
59 Choi et al., supra note 22, at 292 (emphasis added). 
60 Choi et al., supra note 23, at 63 (emphasis added). 
61 See Rodney L. Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 295, 308 tbl.VI, 311 tbl.VII 
(1936). 
62 Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 
YALE L.J. 511, 540 (1994) (book review). 
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Before we cut judges’ pay and jettison judicial independence, however, 
we should scrutinize how the authors derived their normative claims from 
their empirical findings. They do not claim that citations themselves are a 
measure of goodness; in fact, they acknowledge that their measures “do not 
provide a perfect metric for judging skill”63 and are merely “rough prox-
ies.”64 Thus, the fact that Judge A has more citations than Judge B does not 
directly justify an assertion that that Judge A is better than Judge B. 
But once they acknowledge that citations do not actually measure quali-
ty, how can they use aggregate comparisons between groups of judges to 
justify claims about the relative quality of elected judges versus appointed 
judges, or male judges versus female judges? Citation counts could arguably 
be viewed as surrogates65 for some “true” measure of judicial quality, but if 
so, their use as surrogates must be validated. Choi and Gulati justify the 
validity of citation counts largely on theoretical grounds, analogizing the 
body of precedent to a “market” for judicial opinions.66 Because the “price” 
of citing opinions is zero, judges will compete on quality. As they put it, 
“[a]ll judges will cite the best opinions,”67 and therefore, the best judges will 
garner the most citations. 
Many critics, however, have questioned how well citation counts actual-
ly correlate with merit.68 In addition, there are plausible arguments that 
citation measures may be correlated with judicial “vices.”69 One claim is 
that citation counts reward originality, so these measures will reward judges 
who change the law rather than follow it.70 Another argument is that 
unclear opinions may create uncertainty and generate more litigation, thus 
 
63 Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 21, at 29. 
64 Id. at 34. 
65 See supra Section I.B. 
66 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 306. 
67 Id. at 307. 
68 See, e.g., Jay S. Bybee & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
1055, 1058 (2005) (“[W]e question whether the metrics proposed by Professors Choi and Gulati 
appropriately measure the performance of circuit judges.”); Marin K. Levy et al, The Costs of 
Judging Judges by the Numbers, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 313, 314 (2010) (“We believe that there is 
now a general consensus that (1) the judicial virtues the legal empiricists set out to measure 
probably have little bearing on what actually makes for a good judge; and (2) even if they did, the 
empiricists’ chosen variables have not measured those virtues accurately.”); Lawrence B. Solum, A 
Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1389 (2005) (characterizing the argument “that 
citation rate correlates with judicial excellence” as “somewhat obscure”); WERL, On Tournaments 
for Appointing Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 171 (2004) (describing 
a “considerable gap . . . between what the numbers purport to measure and what they actually 
measure”); see also infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text. 
69 Solum, supra note 68, at 1389. 
70 See id. at 1392-93. 
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generating more citations.71 Finally, “an opinion notorious for being ‘wrong’ 
might also lead to many cites.”72 
Because citation counts might be associated with judicial vices as well as 
judicial virtues, theory alone cannot validate the use of citation counts as a 
surrogate for quality. Determining which judicial characteristics constitute 
virtue and vice is a matter of normative theory. But for any conception of 
judicial quality, determining whether citations are more strongly associated 
with virtue or vice is an empirical question. Of course, this is impossible to 
test without first specifying a normative benchmark.73  
Many studies simply assume the validity of citation counts as a surro-
gate for quality, acknowledging that citations could be correlated with 
judicial vice, but dismissing this possibility as unlikely.74 A mere positive 
correlation, however, is not sufficient to validate citations as a surrogate for 
quality.75 Scholars who seek to use citation measures to inform policy 
decisions must be able to convey uncertainty about their assessments of 
judicial merit. This cannot be done without a nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between citations and the conception of merit that is employed. 
Choi and Gulati also defend the proposed use of citation counts in the 
selection of Supreme Court justices on the ground that “objective factors 
will do better than what we have now: a biased and nontransparent process 
overwhelmed by politics.”76 The use of objective measures, however, cannot 
displace normative debates about judicial merit. Citation counts cannot be 
validated as a surrogate without first articulating a conception of merit.  
In addition, there are many objective measures that could potentially be 
used to evaluate judges. How could one choose among them without some 
 
71 See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court 
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 421 (2010) (“The first and most common criticism of 
citation usage is that it fails to capture dispositive rulings that conclusively resolve legal issues.”); 
Montgomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 
339 (1998) (noting that unclear precedents may generate more litigation than clear precedents, 
resulting in more citations). 
72 Robert Henry, Do Judges Think? Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke Law 
Journal's Conference on Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1717 (2009); see also Frank B. 
Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1391 n.25 (2009) (“[S]ome 
citations may be attributable to ‘outrageously’ bad decisions.”). 
73 See Solum, supra note 68, at 1368 (arguing that it is necessary to answer the normative 
question of what makes for excellence in judging before formally measuring judicial performance).  
74 See, e.g., Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 21, at 70 (acknowledging but dis-
missing the concern that rewarding judges for citations might induce them to write “longer and 
more complex opinions that provide more citations”); Cross & Spriggs, supra note 71, at 421 
(“While the ‘settled case’ phenomenon is theoretically problematic for any citation measure, its 
existence is questionable.”). 
75 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
76 Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 21, at 304. 
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normative baseline for comparison? To illustrate, compare the citation 
measures proposed by Choi and Gulati with alternative measures proposed 
by Robert Anderson.77 Whereas Choi and Gulati do not distinguish among 
positive, negative, and neutral citations in their measures, Anderson 
interprets negative citations as evidence of low quality and ignores neutral 
citations. Choi and Gulati count only citations from outside a judge’s 
circuit, whereas Anderson counts citations from both inside and outside a 
judge’s circuit. Finally, Choi and Gulati count citations to all opinions 
authored by a judge, while Anderson counts citations to all decisions in 
which the judge was on the panel. 
Not surprisingly, these two methodologies yield very different rank-
ings.78 Even if both of these measures could potentially be useful for 
measuring judicial performance, how could one know which measure to use? 
Is the difference between the two measures primarily methodological, in the 
sense that one method might be a better surrogate for a common conception 
of judicial quality? Or is the difference primarily normative, in the sense 
that the measures serve as surrogates for competing conceptions of judicial 
merit? 
Anderson characterizes the differences between the measures as both 
methodological and normative. He justifies the exclusion of negative 
citations on normative grounds, arguing that negative citations may be 
appropriate for measuring influence, but that only positive citations are 
appropriate for measuring quality.79 Similarly, he justifies examining panel 
membership rather than opinion authorship on the grounds that it “cap-
ture[s] collegial factors that should enter into a measure of good judging.”80 
But he also claims that part of the difference is methodological, arguing that 
using panel membership is appropriate because it “mitigate[s] the effects of 
selection bias in opinion assignment.”81 
To the extent that the difference between the two measures is methodo-
logical, one cannot assess which is a better surrogate without specifying a 
conception of judicial merit. And to the extent the difference is normative, 
 
77 See generally Robert Anderson IV, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial 
Quality in the United States Courts of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315 (2011) (proposing a method of 
ranking judges that distinguishes between positive and negative citations). 
78 See id. at 349 (“The results of this analysis differ dramatically from those of prior judge 
ranking studies.”). 
79 Id. at 325-26; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics 
on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. & ECON. 385, 389-90 (1993) (“When speaking of influence 
rather than quality, one has no call to denigrate critical citations.”). 
80 Anderson, supra note 77, at 329 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
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the use of objective and quantifiable measures cannot displace normative 
debates about judicial merit. Either way, one cannot choose between these 
two measures without taking a position in the normative debate that the 
citation studies are purporting to circumvent. 
Nevertheless, citation counts could conceivably be validated subjectively. 
Even though conceptions of judicial quality are inherently subjective, 
objective data could still be used to inform those subjective judgments. 
Scholars, for example, could survey informed observers about their percep-
tions of judges’ relative competence or the quality of particular opinions. 
On certain dimensions of judicial quality, there is likely to be strong 
agreement. To take some extreme examples, everyone would agree that 
Chief Justice John Marshall was a greater judge than his contemporary 
Gabriel Duvall,82 or that Learned Hand83 was superior to his colleague 
Martin Manton, who went to prison for accepting bribes.84 On other 
dimensions, however, assessments of judicial quality are likely to be disput-
ed. For example, a comparison of Justices Sotomayor and Alito will likely 
depend on one’s ideological leanings.  
Such surveys could reveal the degree to which conceptions of judicial 
merit are shared and the degree to which they are disputed. The grounds 
for disagreement could potentially be approximated by a small number of 
salient dimensions, such as liberalism versus conservatism or pragmatism 
versus formalism. Empirical studies of citations can never tell us what kind 
of judge we ought to prefer, but they might conceivably shed light on how 
judges measure along these dimensions of judicial merit. To the extent that 
there are commonly shared conceptions of quality, these objective measures 
might at least be able to distinguish good judges on each side of the ideolog-
ical spectrum from mediocre ones. Of course, survey responses do not 
indicate merit in an objective sense, but at least they would correspond to 
the conceptions of merit that are prevalent in scholarly dialogue or demo-
cratic deliberation.  
 
82 See David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 466, 466 (1983) (“Duvall’s performance reveals . . . that he achieved an enviable standard 
of insignificance.”). 
83 Hand is widely recognized as one of the greatest judges in American history. See GERALD 
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE xv (2d ed. 2011) (“Learned Hand is 
numbered among a small group of truly great American Judges of the twentieth Century.”); 
Posner, supra note 62, at 511 (describing Hand as the “third-greatest judge in the history of the 
United States, after Holmes and John Marshall”). 
84 See generally JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 25-93 (1962) (describing Judge 
Manton’s corruption); Allan D. Vestal, A Study in Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 17 (1959) (same). 
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It is essential, however, that citation measures be validated as surrogates 
for some discoverable measure of quality. In theory, it may seem plausible 
that good judges would be more productive and write better opinions, and 
that better opinions would generate more citations. But judicial craft is only 
one factor—and possibly a minor one—in determining how often a case is 
cited. Even a cursory examination can show that citation counts do not 
correspond very well to commonly held perceptions of judicial merit. 
Consider two canonical torts cases—Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.85 
and United States v. Carroll Towing Co.86—which are taught in virtually 
every first-year law school torts class. Judge Cardozo’s opinion in Palsgraf, 
which has been described as “[p]erhaps the most celebrated of all tort 
cases,”87 has been cited 218 times in published opinions in federal and state 
courts.88 Judge Hand’s opinion in Carroll Towing, which formulated the 
“Learned Hand rule” for negligence liability and has been described as one 
of the “two most influential opinions that Hand ever wrote,”89 has been 
cited a total of 177 times.90 By comparison, the opinion in Bonner v. City of 
Prichard,91 which holds that all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to 
October 1, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, has been 
cited 4311 times.92 
Similarly, Marbury v. Madison93 has been cited 252 times in Supreme 
Court opinions, barely more than once per term.94 McCulloch v. Maryland95 
has been cited 326 times in Supreme Court opinions,96 less than twice per 
term. But United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,97 which held that 
the syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court, has been cited 4362 
times in the U.S. Reports.98 
 
85 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
86 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
87 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953). 
88 Westlaw search for “162 N.E. 99” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases 
through December 31, 2011. 
89 Posner, supra note 62, at 513. 
90 Westlaw search for “159 F.2d 169” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases 
through December 31, 2011. 
91 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). 
92 Westlaw search for “661 F.2d 1206” in SCT, CTAR, DCTR, and ALLSTATES databases 
through December 31, 2011. 
93 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
94 Westlaw search for “5 U.S. 137” in SCT database through December 31, 2011. 
95 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
96 Westlaw search for “4 Wheat 316” in SCT database through December 31, 2011. 
97 200 U.S. 321, 337 (1906). 
98 Westlaw search for “200 U.S. 321” in SCT database through December 31, 2011. 
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These examples illustrate that frequency of citation does not necessarily 
correspond to commonly held perceptions of the importance of a holding or 
the quality of the written opinion. A more detailed comparison of Supreme 
Court decisions confirms this same pattern. Figure 1 compares a selection of 
Supreme Court decisions, displaying how often each case was cited per year 
in reported federal cases.99 Canonical constitutional cases are dwarfed by 
holdings on frequently litigated issues such as standards for summary 
judgment and pleading requirements. Brown v. Board of Education100 is cited 
29 times per year, whereas Anderson v. Liberty Lobby101 and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett102—two decisions providing standards for summary judgment—are 
each cited more than 1600 times per year. Since it was decided in 1986, 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby has been cited almost 45,000 times, roughly as 
many times as every case decided by the Marshall Court combined.103  
  
 
 
Figure 1: Federal Citations per Year for Selected  
Supreme Court Decisions 
 
 
99 Westlaw search of SCT, CTAR, and DCTR databases through December 31, 2011. 
100 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
101 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
102 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
103 A sample of pages in Shepard’s spanning the Marshall Court yielded an estimate of 
roughly 45,000 federal citations. 
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Although judicial merit may well influence how often a judge’s opinions 
are cited, these examples show that citation counts are strongly influenced 
by factors unrelated to merit, such as how often an issue is presented in 
litigation. Conceivably, such factors might be less relevant when comparing 
citation counts at the level of individual judges. If each judge decides a mix 
of high- and low-profile cases over time, then citation counts aggregated by 
a judge might conceivably better correlate with commonly held perceptions 
of merit. Such a claim is difficult to test, largely because judicial merit is 
contested, and even subjective perceptions are difficult to quantify. But 
citation statistics for Judge Learned Hand and his contemporaries on the 
Second Circuit, as reported in an article by Judge Richard Posner,104 raise 
serious questions about the validity of these measures, even when aggregat-
ed by judge. Using Posner’s results, I compiled statistics on opinions 
authored and citations per year for judges who were active from 1925 until 
1939, when Learned Hand and Martin Manton served together.105 The 
statistics are based on published majority opinions, and the citation counts 
only include citations by federal courts of appeals. 
It may provide some reassurance that Learned Hand dominates his con-
temporaries, including Manton, in citations per year. But Manton has more 
citations per year than highly respected judges such as Thomas Swan and 
Augustus Hand.106 Moreover, in opinions per year—the measure of 
“productivity” used by Choi and Gulati—Manton easily outpaces all of the 
other Second Circuit judges, including Learned Hand.  
 
104 See Posner, supra note 62. 
105 All analysis is based on Posner’s published results, and not an independent analysis of the 
original data, which are no longer available. 
106 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 242 (stating that once the “Learned Hand-Augustus 
Hand-Thomas Swan triumvirate was in place,” the Second Circuit “symbolized the highest 
judicial quality in the nation”); MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 20-27 (1970) 
(describing widespread respect for Swan and Augustus Hand). Swan had been the dean of Yale 
Law School before joining the bench. 
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Figure 2: Opinion Counts and Citations to Opinions Authored by Se-
cond Circuit Judges, 1925-39 
Note:  Only judges who were active for at least 5 years during 1925–39 are 
included. 
 
Manton’s deficiencies were not merely ethical; he was held in low es-
teem even before evidence of his corruption had surfaced. Learned Hand 
had a poor opinion of Manton, perceiving him as “incapable of turning out 
memoranda and opinions that could earn him the respect from the bar or 
bench.”107 Chief Justice Taft believed that Manton “never should have been 
appointed to the bench in the first place.”108 Other prominent contemporar-
ies described him as “unfit for the bench”109 and “one of Wilson’s worst 
appointments.”110 Yet in terms of two quantitative measures commonly used 
to evaluate judges—“opinion quality” and “productivity”—Manton com-
pares quite favorably to most of his Second Circuit contemporaries. If 
sufficient weight were given to judicial “productivity,” Manton might even 
rank above Learned Hand.  
The fact that such quantitative measures cannot distinguish highly re-
spected circuit judges from a judge widely regarded as one of the worst in 
history raises serious questions about whether these measures are valid 
 
107 GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 237. 
108 DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS APPOINTED 45 (1964). 
109 Id. at 51 (describing opinion of Attorney General Harry Daugherty). 
110 Id. at 63 (quoting Elihu Root). 
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surrogates for quality. Perhaps a more careful analysis of judicial citations 
might yield useful information about some conceptions of judicial merit. 
The analysis here, for example, did not distinguish between positive and 
negative citations, or between in-circuit and out-of-circuit citations. It may 
also be possible to control for outlier opinions that are highly cited, such as 
those involving summary judgment. Various statistical adjustments could 
potentially lead to more refined citation measures that more accurately 
reflect some conception of judicial merit. The multiplicity of possible 
adjustments, however, presents a choice of which to apply, which requires 
some external conception of merit against which the various adjustments 
can be compared. 
III. REVERSAL RATES 
Reversal rates are a commonly used outcome measure in empirical stud-
ies of judicial decisionmaking and are widely used to justify normative 
claims about judges and courts. In the last decade, more than 1000 law 
review articles included some mention of reversal or affirmance rates, 
although many uses were purely descriptive.111 Like citation counts, reversal 
statistics are easy to calculate but can be difficult to interpret.  
Many scholars have advocated using reversal rates as indicators of judi-
cial quality,112 and some state courts use reversal rates in judicial perfor-
mance evaluations.113 Reversal rates are also commonly used to evaluate 
circuits, with one study even assigning letter grades to the various circuits 
based on how often they are reversed by the Supreme Court.114 In debates 
about splitting the Ninth Circuit, scholars and judges have often discussed 
the Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate and debated its normative significance.115 
 
111 Westlaw search for “reversal rate” or “affirmance rate” in JLR database from Jan. 1, 2002 
until December 31, 2011. 
112 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 72, at 1402-05 (defending reversal rates as performance 
indicators for circuit judges); Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 
148, 151-53 (1987) (describing reversal rates as an accepted indicator of trial court performance); 
Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Performance Evaluations Fair to Women and Minorities? A 
Cautionary Tale from Clark County, Nevada, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 731, 751 (2011) (characterizing 
reversal rates as being “among the most relevant and quantifiable objective measures we have” of 
judicial performance). 
113 See David C. Brody, Judicial Performance Evaluations by State Governments: Informing the 
Public While Avoiding the Pitfalls, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 333, 340 (2000) (describing use of reversal rates 
by the Alaska Judicial Council). 
114 Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, 
LANDSLIDE, Jan.-Feb. 2010, at 10. 
115 See Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit in the Country—Fact or Fic-
tion?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1465-70 (1997) (minimizing the significance of the Ninth Circuit’s 
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Judges themselves have considered reversal rates in trial courts and admin-
istrative proceedings in determining whether procedures were adequate 
under the due process clause.116 A growing literature in patent law has 
examined how often the Federal Circuit reverses claim construction deci-
sions by district judges and debated the implications of the reversal rate.117 
One recent study evaluated economic training programs for district 
 
reversal rate because most cases are not reviewed by the Supreme Court and many reversals 
occurred in cases in which “reasonable minds can differ”); Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: 
Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425, 
432 (2000) (describing a circuit’s “disproportionately high reversal rate” in the Supreme Court as a 
“matter of concern”); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth 
Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405, 489 (1998) (denying that the Ninth Circuit’s “high 
reversal rate is a problem that needs to be solved by a circuit split” because it is attributable to 
“ideological disagreement”); Richard A. Posner, Is the Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of 
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 712-13 (2000) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal 
rate is a “meaningless” statistic because reversals “often involve disagreement rather than the 
correction of error,” but claiming that rates of summary reversal have normative significance); 
Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 342 (2006) 
(describing the Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate as “cause for concern”). 
116 See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts, while not over-
whelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their right to appeal 
would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.”); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 346-47 (1976) (viewing reversal rates as “relevant” but “not controlling” in assessing the 
adequacy of administrative procedures, especially when new evidence can be presented on appeal); 
Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 885 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d, 678 F.3d 1013 
(9th Cir. 2012) (holding that Department of Veterans Affairs policy for adjudicating claims for 
mental health benefits “has not worked, given the high reversal rates of those determinations”). 
117 See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction 
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001) ( f inding that the Federal Circuit has reversed 
fewer cases overall, but has increased its claim construction modification and claim interpretation-
based reversal rates); Richard S. Gruner, How High is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and 
Meaning of Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1071 
(2010) (arguing that concerns about claim construction reversal rates are misplaced because most 
appeals involve hard cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent 
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2-3 (2001) (arguing that the claim construction reversal rate is 
“problematic” because “it raises concerns about the efficiency of [the] adjudication system” and 
“creates doubt about the abilities of district court judges to adjudicate complex technical patent 
cases”); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 245-47 (2005) ( f inding an increase in claim construction reversal 
rates and concluding that “[t]he fault . . . undoubtedly lies with the Federal Circuit” because it 
“is not providing sufficient guidance on claim construction”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
223, 245-57 (2008) (examining whether claim construction reversal rates improve as a function of 
judicial experience); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 
1091-107 (2010) (examining the impact of Markman v. Westview Instruments on reversal rates, but 
urging caution in interpreting the results); Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)certainty at the Federal 
Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1171-84 (2010) (arguing that reversal rates in claim construction 
cases are problematic). 
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court judges by measuring how often their decisions in antitrust cases were 
appealed and reversed.118 
Reversal rates have been prominently featured in debates about reform-
ing asylum adjudication. In 2002, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft 
adopted “streamlining” rules for the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 
which permitted decisions by immigration judges to be affirmed by a single 
BIA member in an unsigned opinion.119 The rate at which the BIA reversed 
immigration judge decisions plummeted, leading some commentators to 
criticize the streamlining reforms for allowing errors to go uncorrected.120 
Ashcroft contended that these reversal rates had no significance121 but then 
went on to claim that “the BIA streamlining reforms were a profound 
success” because fewer than ten percent of BIA decisions were reversed by 
circuit courts.122 Yet in a widely noted opinion, Judge Richard Posner cited 
the BIA’s reversal rate in the Seventh Circuit as evidence that immigration 
adjudication had “fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”123 
Legal scholars seem to think that reversal rates are worth discussing, but 
they rarely articulate why these rates are purportedly meaningful. Often, 
reversal rates are conflated with error rates or imbued with unwarranted 
normativity. One study, for example, found that more than two-thirds of 
death sentences in state courts are ultimately overturned on appeal.124 After 
performing a highly sophisticated statistical analysis to examine what 
 
118 See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judg-
es? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-24 
(2011) ( f inding that antitrust decisions by district judges and administrative law judges are more 
likely to be appealed and reversed in complex cases, but less likely to be appealed and reversed 
when the judge had participated in a program that provided basic economic training). 
119 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2010). The streamlining regulations also required the Board to review 
factual findings under the “clear error” standard, rather than de novo. 
120 See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE AMERICAN BAR ASSO-
CIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 40-41 
(2003) (“The federal courts are describing obvious errors committed by the BIA: errors that would 
be comic, if they were not so tragic.”); ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN THE 
AMERICAN COURTS 150 (2010) (“Exacerbating the worry that individual Board member 
adjudications would lead to more errors than a three-member panel was the increase in summary 
affirmances of immigration judges’ decisions that went against the alien.”). 
121 See John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991, 2008 (2009) (agreeing with the Fourth Circuit’s 
observation that reversal statistics are meaningless unless there is “an objectively correct percent-
age of reversals” to which an adjudicative body should aspire). 
122 Id. at 2009. 
123 Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2005). 
124 See Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of Death 
Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209, 214 (2004). 
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factors predicted reversal, the authors considered policy options to reduce 
reversal rates. First, they proposed rules requiring disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence and more funding for defense lawyers at the trial stage.125 But then 
they noted that reversal rates could also be reduced by limiting the grounds 
for reversal and withdrawing funding for attorneys who represent death-
row inmates at the post-conviction stage.126 The authors did not actually 
advocate the latter proposals, acknowledging that “[t]he positive impact of 
such policies is questionable.”127 The fact that they simultaneously consid-
ered increasing funding for trial lawyers and defunding appellate lawyers, 
however, suggests that they were asking the wrong question. By conflating 
reversals with errors,128 the authors lost sight of their normative goals. 
Defunding appellate lawyers may well reduce reversals, but this should 
serve as a reminder that the reduction of reversal rates is not a worthy end 
in itself.  
As with citation counts, reversal rates do not have any intrinsic norma-
tive significance; they are only useful insofar as they can shed light on other 
normatively significant quantities, such as error rates. A reversal is a good 
outcome when the lower court was wrong, but it is a bad outcome when the 
lower court was correct. If the applicable law is indeterminate, a reversal 
reflects the fact that the higher and the lower courts are exercising discre-
tion differently. Reversal rates, however, aggregate “good reversals” and 
“bad reversals,” as well as “ambiguous reversals” when the law is indetermi-
nate.  
Although reversal rates are commonly used to measure error rates of 
lower courts, they accurately reflect error only when four conditions are 
satisfied: the law is always determinate, both courts are addressing the same 
legal question and relying on the same sources of law, all cases are appealed, 
and the higher court is always correct. Scholars can debate whether and 
when the first two conditions hold,129 but the third is rarely satisfied and the 
fourth is almost always implausible. Thus, additional assumptions are 
necessary to draw normative conclusions from reversal rates. 
 
125 Id. at 255. 
126 Id. at 256. 
127 Id. at 257. 
128 See id. at 216-17 (defining the “total error rate” in terms of probabilities of reversal); id. at 
218 (“We counted only error that actually resulted in reversal by the highest court with authority to 
review the verdict at the relevant stage of review.” (emphasis added)).  
129 Ronald Dworkin, most prominently, has adhered to the view that the law is determinate 
even in hard cases. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977). But this 
viewpoint, while influential, is not widely held. Whether courts are addressing the same legal 
question will necessarily depend upon context. 
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The proportion of cases that are appealed is especially relevant when the 
reviewing court is the U.S. Supreme Court, which hears only a tiny fraction 
of petitioned cases. For example, Judge Jerome Farris observed that the 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in 28 out of 29 cases it reviewed 
in 1997.130 Yet he defended the Ninth Circuit by arguing that the Court let 
stand more than 99% of all Ninth Circuit decisions from the previous 
year.131 
A further complication is that reviewing courts do not necessarily con-
sider the same legal issues as lower courts. When lower court decisions are 
reviewed under a deferential standard, a reversal might be stronger evidence 
of error, or at least strong disagreement. Failure to reverse, however, does 
not show that the higher court believed that the lower court judgment was 
correct. 
In addition, higher courts and lower courts are often bound by different 
sources of law, even when resolving the same dispute. A circuit court panel 
may reach a result that is compelled by circuit precedent, but the Supreme 
Court would not be bound by the same circuit precedent. The Supreme 
Court also has the authority to overrule its own precedent, whereas a circuit 
court is obligated to follow such precedent until it is overruled by the 
Supreme Court.132 Thus, reversal by the Supreme Court may well represent 
the application of different legal principles rather than disagreement about 
the same legal principles. In other words, the Supreme Court can overrule a 
circuit court, and both can still be correct. 
Consider Judge Richard Posner’s opinion in Khan v. State Oil Co.,133 an 
antitrust case involving maximum resale price maintenance. Judge Posner 
believed the outcome was controlled by the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Albrecht v. Herald Co.134 Posner criticized Albrecht at length, describing it as 
“unsound when decided, and . . . inconsistent with later decisions by the 
Supreme Court.”135 He continued: “It should be overruled. Someday, we 
expect, it will be.”136 In a not-so-subtle signal to the Supreme Court, Posner 
 
130 See Farris, supra note 115, at 1465. 
131 See id. 
132 See Rodrigues de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“[T]he 
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”). 
133 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
134 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
135 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1363. 
136 Id. 
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wrote, “Yet despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten 
foundations, Albrecht has not been expressly overruled.”137  
Presumably, Judge Posner was not disappointed when the Supreme 
Court reversed him unanimously and overruled Albrecht,138 relying exten-
sively on his reasoning in the Seventh Circuit decision.139 In this example, it 
would certainly be reasonable to assert that the Supreme Court was correct 
to overrule Albrecht, but that Posner was also correct to follow Albrecht 
despite his disagreement with its holding. From this point of view, the 
reversal does not reflect poorly on Posner; it resulted from the fact that the 
Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court were bound by different sources of 
law. To the contrary, this reversal demonstrates Posner’s influence, since he 
was able to convince the Court to hear the case and overrule a longstanding 
precedent that he disfavored. 
To support any kind of conclusion about error rates, reversal rates must 
be interpreted in conjunction with some kind of assumptions about the 
relative competence of higher and lower courts and the determinacy of the 
law in the cases being analyzed.140 In debates about the performance of the 
Ninth Circuit, for example, Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain has cited the 
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate in the Supreme Court as evidence that the 
Ninth Circuit “got it wrong” in a large majority of the cases that were 
reviewed.141 Arthur Hellman has argued that, irrespective of whether the 
ultimate outcome is correct, “it is not healthy when an intermediate court is 
reversed repeatedly by the highest court in the structure.”142 But others 
have argued that the reversal rate reflects positively on the Ninth Circuit. 
According to Michelle Landis Dauber, the problem was “not that the 9th 
Circuit [was] getting the law wrong” but rather that “the Rehnquist Court 
[was] changing the law.”143 Judge Stephen Reinhardt, the most frequently 
reversed circuit judge in the federal courts,144 is said to view his reversal rate 
as a “mark of distinction.”145 Judge Richard Posner, on the other hand, 
 
137 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
138 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
139 See id. at 15-16, 20. 
140 A high degree of disagreement between higher and lower courts may still provide evi-
dence of substantial confusion about the meaning of the law and inefficiency in the resolution of 
disputes. See sources cited supra note 117 (discussing high reversal rates in patent cases). 
141 Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the Supreme 
Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2010). 
142 Hellman, supra note 115. 
143 Michele Landis Dauber, The 9th Circuit Follows, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 19, 2002, at 37. 
144 See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 72, at 1407 tbl.1 (ranking circuit court judges by fre-
quency of reversal). 
145 Heather K. Gerken, Judge Stories, 120 YALE L.J. 529, 530 (2010). 
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argues that reversal rates are meaningless statistics because “reversals by the 
Supreme Court often involve disagreement rather than the correction of 
error, and . . . the Supreme Court has neither the capacity nor the incen-
tive to review more than a tiny percentage of federal courts of appeals 
decisions.”146 
The above commentators agree about what the Ninth Circuit’s reversal 
rate is, but they have sharply differing views about its normative implica-
tions. Reversal rates may be objective, but they must be interpreted in 
conjunction with contestable assumptions about the relative competence of 
higher and lower courts, the institutional obligations of the lower courts, 
and the determinacy of the law in the cases under examination. Judge 
O’Scannlain’s conclusions appear to be posited on a belief that the Supreme 
Court is usually correct when it disagrees with the Ninth Circuit; Judge 
Reinhardt’s and Dauber’s viewpoints are premised upon a more negative 
view of the Supreme Court. Hellman’s position is predicated on a view that 
inferior courts should try to predict how the Supreme Court will rule, but 
Dauber disagrees, arguing that “the job of an intermediate court does not 
entail . . . trying to divine what the current members of the Supreme 
Court might do if and when they get the case.”147 Posner’s view, on the 
other hand, reflects his view of the Court as a “political body”148 rather than 
as a tribunal resolving legally determinate disputes.  
As these conflicting interpretations demonstrate, scholars must be ex-
plicit about the premises that underlie their normative conclusions. These 
premises, moreover, must be plausible. Simple but implausible assumptions 
such as “the higher court is always correct” may support straightforward 
interpretations of reversal rates, but such conclusions have little value. 
What is needed are methods for combining objective data on reversals with 
plausible assumptions to generate useful conclusions that can inform 
policymaking.  
A study of jury verdicts by Bruce Spencer provides an instructive exam-
ple. Spencer examined disagreement between juries and judges in trial 
 
146 Posner, supra note 115, at 712. Posner, however, argues that rates of summary reversal 
provide a useful indicator of circuit quality. See id. at 713. 
147 Dauber, supra note 143, at 36. For sophisticated discussions about whether inferior courts 
ought to predict how a higher court would rule, see Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1994), which argues 
that inferior courts may properly anticipate higher court rulings, and Michael C. Dorf, Prediction 
and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 673 (1995), which argues that the prediction approach 
is inconsistent with the rule of law. 
148 See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 34 (2005) (ob-
serving that, on most constitutional issues, the Supreme Court behaves like a political body). 
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courts, but the same approach applies to disagreement between higher and 
lower courts within the judicial hierarchy. Using data in which trial judges 
had been surveyed about the correct outcome, Spencer estimated the 
accuracy of jury verdicts under the assumption that the judge is at least as 
likely to be correct as the jury.149 Of course, he could have considered 
alternative assumptions as well. Stronger assumptions—such as that the 
judge is twice as likely as the jury to be correct—would have yielded sharper 
inferences. Similarly, weaker assumptions—such as that the judge is correct 
at least 10% of the time—would have yielded weaker inferences. By inter-
preting the data according to a variety of assumptions, empirical scholars 
can make their findings interpretable to an audience with a diverse range of 
viewpoints. 
IV. MEASURING THE RULE OF LAW: STUDIES  
OF INTERJUDGE DISPARITY  
A central feature of the rule of law is that the application of legal force is 
governed by publicized rules rather than “the predilections of the individual 
decisionmaker.”150 A large body of empirical research has sought to measure 
the degree to which systems of adjudication deviate from this ideal. Such 
studies have typically documented statistical disparities among judges—
differences in their rates of reaching various types of dispositions—and 
concluded that the rule of law is violated. Such claims are typically followed 
by calls for legal or institutional reform. 
The earliest example of such a study may be an annual report published 
by the criminal magistrates of New York City in 1914,151 which provided 
detailed figures depicting the magistrates’ conviction rates for various 
offenses. The magistrates reported large interjudge disparities in cases 
involving public intoxication, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and peddling 
without a license, but more modest disparities in cases involving cruelty to 
animals and violations of the motor vehicle laws.152  
 
149 See Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 305, 310-14 (2007) (estimating the accuracy of jury verdicts from data on judge–jury 
agreement). 
150 RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 17 (2001). 
151 See NEW YORK BOARD OF CITY MAGISTRATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CITY MAG-
ISTRATES’ COURTS OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (F IRST DIVISION) FOR YEAR ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 1914 (1914) (compiling judicial outcomes with the intent of dissemination to the 
general public).  
152 See id. at 50-61 (providing numerical and graphical representations of magistrates’ deci-
sions in various categories of cases). 
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The magistrates were not trying to advance any grand theories about 
law or adjudication; they merely hoped that publication of the statistics 
would help the magistrates “recognize [their] own personal peculiarities” 
and “correct any that cannot be justified in light of the records of [their] 
associates.”153 But their reports provided inspiration to legal realists such as 
Jerome Frank154 and to political scientists such as Charles Grove Haines,155 
who viewed the results as confirmation that adjudication was inevitably 
idiosyncratic.  
Since the publication of the magistrates’ report in 1914, numerous stud-
ies have documented significant interjudge disparities in cases involving 
criminal law,156 social security disability claims,157 and asylum adjudica-
tion.158 The original magistrates’ report had modest normative goals, but 
many of these later studies advocated bold reforms. Disparity studies 
provided much of the impetus for the enactment of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines159 and the disability grid for social security disability claims.160 
More recently, scholars have been debating proposed reforms to address 
disparities in asylum adjudication.161 Yet despite the large number of 
disparity studies that have been conducted and the prominence of the policy 
claims that have been advanced, there has been surprisingly little discussion 
about how observable disparities relate to normatively significant concepts.  
 
153 George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90, 98 
(1919). 
154 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 124 (1930). 
155 See Charles Grove Haines, General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Eco-
nomic Influences in the Decisions of Judges, 177 ILL. L. REV. 96 (1922). 
156 See, e.g., WAYNE L. MORSE & RONALD H. BEATTIE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE IN OREGON 151-69 (1932); James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge 
Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999); 
Emil Frankel, The Offender and the Court: A Statistical Analysis of the Sentencing of Delinquents, 31 
AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 448 (1940); Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual 
Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933); Paul J. 
Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 99 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1999); A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Really Matter? 
An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 337 (1997); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Whitney North Seymour, Jr., 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District 
of New York, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 163 (1973); Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically 
Based Sentencing Guidelines?, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 293 (1998). 
157 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY 
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM 21 (1978). 
158 See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27. 
159 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 25, at 104-142. 
160 See generally MASHAW, supra note 26. 
161 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits to 
Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413 (2007); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 378-89. 
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A.  The Normative Implications of Disparity 
In the century since the magistrates released their annual report, the 
methodology of disparity studies has barely changed. The studies count 
judges’ decisions and report rates at which they reach various types of 
outcomes. Whenever disparities are found, the authors conclude that some 
reform is needed. Yet only a few of these studies have acknowledged that 
these statistical disparities by themselves do not have intrinsic normative 
significance. As one study of social security disability adjudication observed:  
Two judges with different [rates of reversing disability determinations] are 
probably behaving differently. But the reverse is not necessarily true: there 
is no reason to exclude the possibility that two judges with 50 percent 
[rates] are also behaving differently. Indeed, the likelihood is great that the 
existing statistics mask an indeterminate additional amount of nonuniformi-
ty in the judge-to-judge handling of [social security] claims.162  
Thus, although large disparities among judges are problematic, small 
disparities do not necessarily indicate that a system of adjudication is 
functioning well. If two social security judges were deciding cases using 
coin flips, there would be no disparity, since both would reverse agency 
determinations 50% of the time. This means that any existing disparities in 
grant rates could be eliminated by ordering all judges to flip coins. The 
absurdity of such a proposal demonstrates that eliminating statistical 
disparity is not itself a worthy goal. Statistical disparity is only of interest 
insofar as it can shed light on other values. 
To understand the normative implications of these studies, it is neces-
sary to articulate the values at stake and to explain how they relate to the 
measureable statistics. Some of the prior scholarship has made efforts to 
identify the relevant values, such as consistency, correctness, determinacy, 
fairness, predictability, non-arbitrariness, and the rule of law.163 But there 
has been little effort to explain how these values can be measured using 
available data. In fact, the relationships between these values and measure-
able statistics can be quite complex. 
 
162 MASHAW ET AL., supra note 157, at 22. 
163 See id. at 13-27 (consistency and correctness); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 299-
300 (predictability, fairness, and rule of law); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES L. 185, 190-92 (2007) (predictability, non-arbitrariness, and fairness). 
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B.  Consistency, Predictability, and Comparative Justice 
Statistical disparities are of interest in part because they provide evi-
dence of interjudge inconsistency—meaning that some cases would have been 
decided differently if they had been assigned to different judges. Indeed, 
many discussions of interjudge disparity focus on inconsistency as a norma-
tive concept.164 Inconsistency has normative significance for two distinct 
reasons. The first is that it diminishes the predictability of adjudication. 
The rule of law requires that people have notice regarding how the law will 
be applied so that they can conform to its requirements and plan their 
affairs accordingly.165 Notice will necessarily be inadequate to the extent 
that the application of the law depends upon which judge is deciding each 
case.166 
Inconsistency among judges also implicates comparative justice.167 Some 
legal rights may be comparative, in the sense that “a person’s due is deter-
minable only by reference to his relations to other persons.”168 In the 
sentencing context, for example, moral or legal principles may determine 
that two offenders are equally culpable and should therefore receive the 
same sentence, even if those principles do not uniquely determine what that 
sentence should be. If two such offenders receive different sentences only 
 
164 See, e.g., Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in Which Vocational Factors Must be 
Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349, 55,351 (Nov. 28, 1978) ( j u stifying the grid rule for social 
security disability determinations on the ground that it would “better assure consistency of 
determinations”); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 7 
(1973) (criticizing the federal sentencing process for failing to provide “any semblance of the 
consistency demanded by the ideal of equal justice”); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 299 
(“Americans don’t love consistent decisionmaking merely because we think that fairness to the 
parties requires that similar cases should have similar outcomes. We also like the predictability 
that stare decisis offers.”). 
165 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39-40 (1964) (“Government says to the 
citizen in effect, ‘These are the rules we expect you to follow. If you follow them, you have our 
assurance that they are the rules that will be applied to your conduct.’”); Jules L. Coleman & 
Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 582 (1993) (noting 
that predictability provides agents with “the opportunity to conform their behavior to law’s 
demands”); Waldron, supra note 163, at 191 (“An important element of most theories of the Rule 
of Law is that those who make and administer state policy should do what they can to diminish its 
unpredictability and provide a solid and reliable basis for calculation by ordinary citizens.”). 
166 Consistency is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for predictability; even if all 
judges would decide a case the same way, that outcome might not be predictable. However, one 
might expect that a knowledgeable observer would be able to predict such an outcome with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 165, at 584-85 (discussing how 
“lawyers can and do predict, with a fairly high degree of accuracy, what outcomes judges will 
reach” by relying on a “‘folk’ social scientific theory of adjudication”). 
167 See Waldron, supra note 163, at 191-92 (discussing how inconsistent treatment of litigants 
implicates comparative justice). 
168 Joel Feinberg, Noncomparative Justice, 83 PHIL. REV. 297, 298 (1974) (emphasis omitted). 
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because they were sentenced by different judges, such a result would 
constitute a violation of comparative justice.  
Interjudge inconsistency, however, only captures one aspect of compara-
tive justice. If two judges fail to treat like cases alike in precisely the same 
way—perhaps by exhibiting the same degree of racial bias—then they could 
be perfectly consistent with each other yet still violate comparative justice. 
Nevertheless, inconsistency provides some evidence of comparative injus-
tice when the cases under examination present common legal or factual 
patterns. 
Interjudge inconsistency appears to have an intuitive relationship with 
observable data. If two social security judges are granting benefits to 
claimants at very different rates, then they probably are treating the claim-
ants inconsistently. Yet the relationship between measurable statistical 
disparity and inconsistency is far more complex than the disparity studies 
have acknowledged.169 The difference between the judges’ grant rates only 
determines lower and upper bounds for inconsistency, but cannot identify 
the precise level. Suppose, for example, that Judge A grants benefits to 30% 
of claimants and Judge B grants benefits to 40% of claimants. If these two 
judges saw a comparable mix of cases, then it follows that they would have 
reached different results in at least 10% of the cases. There is no reason, 
however, to presume that they would have disagreed exactly 10% of the 
time. In fact, they could have disagreed as much as 70% of the time if they 
would have granted benefits to entirely different sets of claimants.  
Without more information, it is impossible to know whether the rate of 
inconsistency between Judges A and B is closer to 10% or 70%. Measuring 
inconsistency requires not only the judges’ grant rates, but also the degree 
to which their decisions are correlated. There are no data that can provide 
estimates of correlation, however, because the two judges are never ob-
served deciding the same case. Conceivably, one could administer surveys 
to Judge A and Judge B and compare their reactions to identical fact 
patterns, which could then be used to compute the correlation between their 
decisions. A few studies did administer such surveys in the 1970s and early 
1980s,170 but to my knowledge, no recent disparity study has sought to 
measure the correlation of judges’ decisions using surveys.  
 
169 See Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy, and Error in Adjudication, 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. ( forthcoming Spring 2014) (manuscript at 6-20), available at 
http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/aht011?ijkey= 
f68R7vaaKTMP3y0&keytype=ref (constructing bounds on interjudge inconsistency from judges’ 
rates of reaching different outcomes). 
170 See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SEN-
TENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974), available at 
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This simple example involved only two judges and assumed that the 
judges’ grant rates were known exactly. When there are more than two 
judges, the relationship between grant rates and inconsistency becomes far 
more complex.171 Complex statistical problems arise when judges’ grant 
rates are not known precisely, but must be inferred from judges’ decisions 
in actual cases.172 
C.  Determinacy and Correctness 
The concept of interjudge consistency was defined without reference to 
the content of law or any substantive conception of justice. This makes 
inconsistency easier to conceptualize but also limits its utility as a normative 
metric. Inconsistency may be most important in settings where predictabil-
ity is paramount and correctness is a secondary concern. As Justice Brandeis 
wrote, it is sometimes “more important that the applicable rule of law be 
settled than that it be settled right.”173 But in many settings, assessing 
whether a system of adjudication satisfies the requirements of law and 
justice may be more important than whether it provides consistent re-
sults.174 
Any attempt to measure whether decisions are correct or just will typi-
cally require addressing concepts that are not objectively measureable, at 
least whenever the meaning of law or the requirements of justice are 
disputed. Nevertheless, it is possible to make limited objective claims about 
correctness on the basis of empirical data. Consider, for example, one 
finding by Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein in a study of circuit court cases 
reviewing administrative agency decisions for arbitrariness: judges who are 
 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/2dcrstdy.pdf/$file/2dcrstdy.pdf (analyzing the results 
from a survey of district judges on sentencing severity); Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmak-
ing: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 524 (1981) (same); Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A 
Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975) (analyzing sentences 
issued in districts that used sentencing councils, in which judges shared preliminary sentence 
recommendations for the same offenders). Some more recent studies have examined whether lay 
respondents have similar rank ordering for criminal offenses. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert 
Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829 (2007) ( f inding 
that lay respondents largely agree about the relative seriousness of various criminal offenses). 
171 See Fischman, supra note 169, at 14-15 (defining and stating bounds for inconsistency with 
more than two judges).  
172 See id. at 30-32 (deriving a method for making statistical inferences on inconsistency with 
observational data). 
173 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
174 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 181 (1986) (“Suppose we can rescue only some 
prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even when only luck, not any principle, 
will decide whom we save and whom we leave to torture.”). 
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Republican appointees are 14% more likely than Democratic appointees to 
vote to invalidate liberal agency decisions.175 Although this empirical result 
cannot tell us how many of these agency decisions ought to have been 
invalidated, Miles and Sunstein argue that the disparity itself provides 
evidence of legal error: “We cannot rule out the possibility that one group 
has it essentially right. But it is not possible that both groups have it 
essentially right, and we suspect that errors can be found from both 
sides.”176  
This interpretation relies on the controversial premise that every case 
has a unique correct outcome. Under this assumption, if Democrat- and 
Republican-appointed judges would disagree in at least 14% of cases review-
ing liberal agency decisions, then one side or the other must be wrong. This 
conclusion is justified even if we cannot know when Democrats and Repub-
licans would disagree or which judges would be wrong. Since half of these 
cases, on average, would be decided by judges who are correct and half by 
judges who are wrong, we can expect that at least 7% of these cases will be 
wrongly decided. 
 Although Miles and Sunstein have situated studies such as theirs within 
a “New Legal Realism,”177 there are important differences between their 
normative premises and those of the legal realists, who emphatically 
rejected the notion that the law was always determinate.178 Miles and 
Sunstein offer an important interpretation, but the notion that judges 
should be evaluated on the basis of their adherence to “paper rules”179 is not 
something that the legal realists would have endorsed. 
Miles and Sunstein suggest an alternative interpretation of their results, 
which is more in line with the realist perspective: studies such as theirs 
“represent an effort to test certain intuitive ideas about the indeterminacy of 
law.”180 If judicial disagreement is taken as evidence that the law fails to 
provide a correct answer, then a 14% rate of disagreement between Democratic 
 
175 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761, 777 tbl.1 (2008) (comparing Democrat- and Republican-appointed circuit court 
judges’ validation rates with respect to “liberal” agency decisions). 
176 Id. at 807. 
177 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 
(2008). 
178 See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism (“The Realists famously argued that the law was 
‘indeterminate.’”), in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL 
THEORY 50, 51 (Martin P. Golding & William Edmundson eds., 2004). 
179 See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 448 (defining “[p]aper rules” as “the accepted doctrine of 
the time and place—what the books there say ‘the law’ is,” in contrast to “real rules,” which are 
“what the courts will do in a given case”). 
180 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 834 (emphasis added). 
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and Republican judges would mean that the outcome must be indeterminate 
in at least 14% of these cases.181  
Claims about indeterminacy and error can be viewed as alternative in-
terpretations of statistical disparity. If judges would disagree about how 
cases ought to be decided, then there must be some combination of legal 
indeterminacy and judicial error. Decomposing disparities into combina-
tions of indeterminacy and error turns out to be a rather complicated 
statistical problem and still can only yield feasible combinations of indeter-
minacy and error rates.182 As with inconsistency, the problem becomes more 
complicated with multiple judges and when grant rates must be inferred 
from judges’ decisions.183 Any effort to reach more precise interpretations of 
statistical disparity will necessarily require much stronger assumptions 
about the degree of legal determinacy and about the correct answers to 
various kinds of cases.184 
D.  Conclusion  
Empirical studies on interjudge disparity have enormous potential for 
improving the quality of systems of adjudication. In order to justify reform, 
however, it is important for these studies to be precise about the values at 
stake and how they are measured. If one wants to promote consistency, then 
bureaucratic controls or even quotas would be an effective solution.185 
Selecting more capable judges or providing better training, as some have 
advocated,186 might reduce error rates but could not reduce legal indetermi-
nacy.  
All too often, these studies have simply reported the disparities and let 
the audience reach judgments about the normative implications. The 
relationships between the data and the relevant normative concepts are far 
too complex, however, for intuition to be a reliable guide. Instead of 
 
181 These disparities could be interpreted in terms of epistemic indeterminacy, meaning that 
the law is not knowable to competent judges. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indetermi-
nacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134, 138-39 (1990). They could also be interpreted as evidence of causal 
indeterminacy, meaning that the law fails to cause judges to reach the correct outcome. See Brian 
Leiter, Legal Indeterminacy, 1 LEGAL THEORY 481, 481-82 (1995). 
182 See Fischman, supra note 169, at 21-27 (discussing how to determine feasible combinations 
of indeterminacy and error rates from observational data). 
183 See id. at 21-27  
184 See id. at 27-28 (discussing how assumptions can sharpen inferences about indeterminacy 
and error). 
185 The fact that many scholars oppose such reforms in asylum adjudication suggests that 
consistency is not actually their primary concern. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 27, at 379 
(opposing bureaucratic controls and quotas). 
186 See id. at 380-81. 
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“letting the data speak,” we must start by focusing on the normative values 
at stake, and develop methods that can give useful answers about whether 
and how to reform legal institutions.  
V.  BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN ‘IS’ AND ‘OUGHT’ 
Parts II–IV of this Article criticized a variety of empirical studies for 
failing to credibly reunite ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Some studies sought to connect 
their findings to prescriptive claims but never explained how the phenome-
na measured related to any normative concepts. Other studies reported a 
variety of descriptive statistics without interpretation, placing the burden 
on unsophisticated audiences to decipher the implications of the findings.  
It would be easy to fault the authors of these studies for claiming too 
much or for using flawed research designs. But the reality is that these 
studies are not aberrations. Many of them employed methods that are 
widely accepted in contemporary empirical legal studies, and several were 
even published in prestigious peer-reviewed journals. 
The fundamental problem is that empirical legal methodology lacks 
frameworks for connecting empirical findings with normative conclusions. 
In this Part, I consider steps that scholars can take to make empirical 
research more relevant to the study of law. First, they should prioritize 
normative questions, and be explicit about the values that motivate their 
research. Second, they should allow substantive questions to drive their 
choice of methods, and not the other way around. Third, they need to be 
more explicit about how they are combining objective findings with contest-
able assumptions in order to reach normative conclusions. Finally, they 
should think more carefully about how empirical findings generalize from a 
research setting to a policy-relevant context. 
A.  Prioritizing Normative Goals 
There is deep disagreement among legal scholars about whether and 
how empirical legal research should be guided by normative goals. These 
debates, of course, are not new. Llewellyn and Pound famously debated 
whether the ‘is’ could be divorced from the ‘ought,’ but Llewellyn’s concep-
tion of a “temporary divorce” was controversial even among the legal 
realists. Felix Cohen agreed that empirical research should be guided by 
normative questions187 but shared Pound’s skepticism that ‘is’ and ‘ought’ 
 
187 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 849 (1935) (“Legal description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of values.”). 
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could ever be separated.188 Others, such as Herman Oliphant and Underhill 
Moore, believed that empirical scholars should simply engage in a value-
free description of the facts as they see them, without concern for any 
normative objectives.189  
The value-free approach to legal research was not successful for Oli-
phant and Moore, whose empirical research was widely derided as point-
less.190 But their viewpoint is widely shared among contemporary 
empiricists.191 There is much concern about keeping ‘is’ and ‘ought’ sepa-
rate,192 but far less emphasis on reuniting them. Many non-empiricists, 
however, have sharply criticized empirical legal scholarship for lacking 
relevance to normative questions in legal scholarship.193 
This is, of course, a normative debate about the objectives of empirical 
legal scholarship. These commentators disagree about what constitutes good 
scholarship and how best to produce it. Resolving these debates, therefore, 
requires clarifying the goals of legal scholarship and considering how they 
can be advanced by empirical research.  
 
188 Id. (“The relation between positive legal science and legal criticism is not a relation of 
temporal priority, but of mutual dependence.” (citing Pound, supra note 6)). 
189 See Underhill Moore, Essay (“[U]ntil [precise knowledge of the specific effects of law on 
behavior] is available, any discussion of the relative desirability of alternative social ends which 
may be achieved by law is largely day-dreaming.”), in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF 
SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 203, 206-07 ( Julius Rosenthal Found. for Gen. L., Nw. U. ed. 
1987) (1941); Herman Oliphant, Facts, Opinions, and Value-Judgments, 10 TEX. L. REV. 127, 137 
(1932) (“[I]t is no evidence that a student of law is deficient in moral sense if he merely observes 
and records the uniformities of social behavior with which the law is concerned . . . . It may, on 
the contrary, be substantial evidence of his desire to get on with what is his proper job at least, 
viz., to identify rather than to evaluate the social consequences of particular legal measures and 
devices.”). 
190 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text. 
191 See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a 
Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1733 (“[S]tudies may be done largely because data 
are available, but no apology is needed for doing so.”); Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, 
Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. LAW 
& SOC. SCI. 555, 574 (2010) (“[S]ome variants of the new legal empiricism often seem to be 
motivated less by systematic arguments about fundamental social processes than by casual 
curiosity, commonsense predictions, and readily available data.”). 
192 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003) 
(“Too much legal scholarship ignores the rules of inference and applies instead the ‘rules’ of 
persuasion and advocacy.”). 
193 See Barry Friedman, supra note 20, at 262-63 (“Oftentimes positive scholarship seems to 
be struggling with the normative implications of its work only after the project is complete, if at 
all. One sees indications of a ‘research now, justify later’ approach. . . . Normative bite ought to 
define the problem, not be an afterthought.”); see also C. Edwin Baker, Viewpoint Diversity and 
Media Ownership, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 651, 663 (2009) (“Policy is misled if it relies on what is 
easy to measure rather than what is important.”).  
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A comparison between law and other disciplines is instructive. The 
natural sciences, for example, are primarily descriptive. As Edward Rubin 
explains, “[T]he discourse of natural science . . . begins from the 
premise that there is a real world ‘out there,’ separate from conscious 
human control. Prescriptive statements about this world would be mean-
ingless . . . .”194 The role of normativity in the social sciences, however, 
remains controversial. As Rubin notes, some social scientists adopt the 
descriptive orientation of the natural sciences, proceeding as though their 
subject matter were “a fixed phenomenon, ‘out there’ beyond the control of 
rational decision-makers.”195 Many social scientists reject this approach, 
however, arguing that because the social sciences study institutions that 
serve social values, research questions in these fields must have some 
relevance to these values.196  
Legal scholarship, like the social sciences, studies a social institution. An 
essential feature of law, however, is its normativity;197 the law is developed 
 
194 Edward L. Rubin, Law And and the Methodology of Law, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 521, 524. 
195 Id. at 537. This detached perspective would accurately describe most quantitative research 
in political science. See IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2 (2003) (“Norma-
tive and explanatory theories of democracy grow out of literatures that proceed, for the most part, 
on separate tracks, largely uninformed by one another.”); Robert A. Dahl, The Behavioral Approach 
in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 763, 770-
771 (1961) (“The empirical political scientist is concerned with what is, as he says, not with what 
ought to be.”); John Gerring & Joshua Yesnowitz, A Normative Turn in Political Science?, 38 POLITY 
101, 102 (2006) (“Traditionally, the scientific study of politics has been associated with a value-
neutral approach to politics. One seeks to uncover what is, not what ought to be, in the political 
realm.”). 
196 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. SHADISH ET AL., EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 476 (2002) (“Although scientists have 
frequently avoided value questions in the mistaken belief that they cannot be studied scientifically 
or that science is value free, we cannot avoid values even if we try. The conduct of experiments 
involves values at every step, from question selection through the interpretation and reporting of 
results.”); MAX WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 21 (Edward A. Shils 
& Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949) (“The problems of the empirical disciplines are, of course, 
to be solved ‘non-evaluatively.’ . . . But the problems of the social sciences are selected by the 
value-relevance of the phenomena treated.”); Robert A. Dahl, Normative Theory, Empirical 
Research, and Democracy (“Identifying a question that is important is a moral and normative issue, 
not a scientific issue.”), in PASSION, CRAFT, AND METHOD IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 113, 134 
(Gerardo L. Munck & Richard Snyder eds., 2007); Robert Merton, Technical and Moral Dimensions 
of Policy Research (“The investigator may naively suppose that he is engaged in the value-free 
activity of research, whereas in fact he may simply have so defined his research problems that the 
results will be of use to one group in the society, and not to others. His very choice and definition 
of a problem reflects his tacit values.”), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 70 (1973); Gerring & Yesnowitz, supra note 195, at 112 (“Art for art’s 
sake has some plausibility, and science for science’s sake might also be argued in a serious vein. But no 
serious person would adopt as her thesis social science for social science’s sake. Social science is science 
for society’s sake.”). 
197 See Rubin, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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consciously by human decisionmakers for the purpose of guiding human 
conduct.198 Law has no fixed reality that can be described without an 
understanding of its purposes.199 Rather, the law is continually evolving, 
and one function of legal scholarship is to address how it ought to evolve.200  
Even though empirical research is inherently descriptive, choices about 
what legal phenomena to examine and what relationships to analyze require 
evaluative judgments of importance.201 Scholars have advanced various 
conceptions of importance, but all of these require some reference to values. 
First, empirical research could be considered important if it can guide legal 
reform, an assessment that necessarily requires a value judgment.202 Second, 
empirical research may be important if it describes legal phenomena that 
participants in the legal system find important—which would require 
understanding their normative viewpoints.203  
Finally, empirical research may be important if it contributes to the de-
velopment of theories that can in turn guide legal reform or illuminate the 
 
198 See Rubin, supra note 194, at 525 (“Modern legal scholars regard law as the product of 
conscious decision by public decision-makers, and possibly others.”). 
199 Although some classical formalists may have viewed law as being part of a fixed reality 
“beyond the reach of conscious decision-makers,” virtually all contemporary legal scholars reject 
this perspective. See id. Even these formalists, of course, recognized the normativity of law. See id. 
200 See id. (“There is thus no fixed reality, but rather an ongoing process by which people in 
certain positions make decisions; in bald terms, law is created, not discovered. This sentiment has 
led to prescriptive efforts to improve the quality of those decisions according to the scholar’s own 
views about law or public policy.”). 
201 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 17 (2d ed. 2011) (“[A] judg-
ment of significance and importance must be made if [a description of law] is to be more than a 
vast rubbish heap of miscellaneous facts.”); Cohen, supra note 187, at 848 (“The prospect of 
determining the consequences of a given rule of law appears to be an infinite task . . . unless we 
approach it with some discriminating criterion of what consequences are important.”); Pound, supra 
note 6, at 697 (“[A] science of law must be something more than a descriptive inventory. There 
must be selection and ordering of the materials so as to make them intelligible and useful.”). 
202 See Cohen, supra note 187, at 848 (“[A] criterion of importance presupposes a criterion of 
values”). 
203 See ANDREI MARMOR, POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 157 (2001) (“[A]n un-
derstanding of a normative social practice, like law . . . must comprise an understanding of its 
points, that is, of the values which would render the participants’ beliefs in their reasons for action 
intelligible.”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 295 (“The explanation of human behavior 
related to law has to take account of the way people’s beliefs about the law, normatively under-
stood, affect their behavior”); Pound, supra note 6, at 700 (“Faithful portrayal of what courts and 
law makers and jurists do is not the whole task of a science of law. One of the conspicuous 
actualities of the legal order is the impossibility of divorcing what they do from the question what 
they ought to do or what they feel they ought to do.”); Leslie Green, Law and the Causes of Judicial 
Decisions 33 (Oxford Legal Research Paper Series 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/id=1374608 (endorsing Hans Kelsen’s view that “if [the sociology of law] 
was to touch its intended subject, [it] would have to study beliefs and actions oriented towards 
legal norms as identified by jurisprudence”). 
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legal system to its participants.204 Certainly, such research need not have a 
direct normative payoff; a study may examine phenomena that seem narrow 
and unimportant, but the findings may generalize to a wide variety of 
contexts. Assessing what theories are useful, however, still requires a value-
laden judgment; a theory that can only explain insignificant phenomena 
cannot itself be significant. 
Empirical research may thus seek to advance an immediate policy pre-
scription, to describe the legal system in a meaningful way, or to contribute 
to theory development. In any of these pursuits, however, the importance 
of the research must be assessed by reference to values. This is not to say 
that empiricists must personally take controversial positions in normative 
debates; one can acknowledge the viewpoints held by others without 
endorsing them. It is not too much to ask, however, that empirical research 
proceed in a conscious recognition of the values it intends to serve, and that 
scholars make efforts to clarify how their findings relate to the values that 
motivated their research. 
B.  Rethinking Empirical Legal Methodology 
The studies criticized in Parts II–IV had worthy motivations, but they 
struggled to credibly connect their results to normative claims. As these 
discussions showed, the relationship between measureable objects and 
normative concepts is often complex. Because legal scholarship lacks its own 
empirical methodology, empiricists typically adhere to the methods of other 
disciplines, irrespective of whether they are suited to address the questions 
of legal scholarship.  
Empirical legal methodology needs to be more closely tethered to the 
motivating questions in legal scholarship. Because the method used deter-
mines the question that is answered, the evaluation of methods and ques-
tions cannot be disentangled. Yet scholars have too often allowed the choice 
of method to determine the question that is asked, rather than having the 
substantive question determine the choice of method. 
A 2002 critique of empirical legal scholarship by political scientists Lee 
Epstein and Gary King is often taken as representing the dominant view on 
empirical legal methodology. Declaring that the “state of empirical legal 
 
204 David Collier et al., Critiques, Responses, and Trade-offs: Drawing Together the Debate 
(“[S]tudies that help advance theory in a way that gives scholars new leverage in conceptualizing 
and explaining significant outcomes would also be considered important.”), in RETHINKING 
SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS 125, 127 (Henry E. Brady & David 
Collier eds., 2010). 
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scholarship [was] deeply flawed,”205 they criticized legal scholars for their 
inattention to methodological concerns206 and emphasized the need to 
develop empirical methods that were tailored to questions that arise in legal 
scholarship.207 
Although Epstein and King were right about the need for an empirical 
legal methodology, they never explained why existing methodologies were 
inadequate. In fact, the bulk of their article was devoted to criticizing 
empirical legal scholars for failing to comply with standards that had been 
established in other disciplines. Of course, empirical methodologies need not 
be trapped within disciplinary boundaries, and many methods from other 
disciplines have proven useful in empirical legal studies.  
Yet all too often, discussions of empirical legal methodology have been 
divorced from discussions of substantive questions. Even Epstein and King 
had little to say about the objectives of empirical legal scholarship.208 In a 
brief section entitled “The Research Question,” Epstein and King advocated 
a permissive approach toward research questions that sharply contrasted 
with their demanding rules for every other aspect of empirical scholar-
ship.209 They provided two criteria for research questions: “they contribute to 
existing knowledge and they have some importance for the real world.”210 But the 
first criterion is nearly vacuous—how much research does not contribute in 
some way to existing knowledge?—and the meaning of “importance” in the 
second criterion was never articulated.211 Epstein and King even declared 
these criteria to be entirely optional.212 In their view, it is appropriate for 
“[i]nvestigators [to] conduct rigorous empirical research about any question, 
no matter how narrow it may be, no matter whether they are the only ones 
 
205  Epstein & King, supra note 192, at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
206 See id. at 11 (“[T]he complete list of all law review articles devoted to improving, under-
standing, explicating, or adapting the rules of inference is as follows: none.”). 
207 See id. at 11 (“The law is important enough to have a subfield devoted to methodological 
concerns, as does almost every other discipline that conducts empirical research. Scholars toiling 
in the social, natural, and physical sciences can help, but a whole field cannot count on others with 
differing goals and perspectives to solve all of the problems that law professors may face.”). 
208 See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 
U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 154 (2002) (“The reader of Epstein and King’s 133-page article will find 
almost nothing that speaks to the simple question, ‘What is legal scholarship for?’”). 
209 See Epstein & King, supra note 192, at 55-61. 
210 Id. at 55. 
211 With regard to the second criterion, they write, “This is a rule about which we need not 
say too much.” Id. at 60. 
212 See id. at 55 (writing that it “is not particularly problematic” that “many questions asked 
by academics and others about legal phenomena do not meet these standards”). 
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interested in it, no matter if it has virtually no implications for the real 
world.”213 
Of course, Epstein and King were not actually advocating the pursuit of 
trivial questions. Nevertheless, by leaving the criteria of importance unex-
amined, they undermined their call for more rigorous methods in empirical 
legal research. Different methodological approaches will yield different 
estimates of causal or correlational relationships among observable varia-
bles. Any of these estimates can be rationalized as the answer to some 
research question, if perhaps an unimportant one. Evaluating empirical 
methods therefore requires some assessment of fit between statistical 
estimates that can be generated and important substantive research ques-
tions. This, in turn, requires criteria for determining what is an important 
question. 
When standards for research questions are left unarticulated, it is all too 
tempting to allow the availability of data to define the research question.214 
Without some criterion of importance, one can start with a data set, apply a 
preferred statistical technique, and then rationalize a research question that 
is answered by the resulting estimate.215 This may seem perverse, but it is in 
fact an inevitable consequence of a mindset that prioritizes adherence to 
methodological “rules” over normative relevance. If we combine exacting 
standards for deriving inferences from data with lax standards for relating 
those inferences to normative questions, there will be an inevitable pressure 
to reorient empirical research projects around phenomena that are conven-
iently measured and analyzed, rather than those that can genuinely inform 
policymaking. This leads to misplaced efforts at empirical sophistication, 
such as projects that explain the impact of judicial characteristics on citation 
counts using fixed-effects negative binomial regression with clustered 
 
213 Id. at 55 (emphasis added). They do provide the caveat that “posing research questions in 
ways that attract the interest of others . . . is good career advice.” Id. 
214 See Friedman, supra note 20, at 262 (“[T]he temptation is great to rest on what data is 
readily available, allowing that to define the questions that are asked and the way in which they 
are answered.”); Brian Leiter, On So-Called “Empirical Legal Studies” and Its Problems, BRIAN 
LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. ( July 6, 2010), http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2010/07/on-
socalled-empirical-legal-studies.html (“[T]oo much of the work is driven by the existence of a data 
set, rather than an intellectual or analytical point.”). 
215 Cf. CHARLES F. MANSKI, PUBLIC POLICY IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: ANALYSIS AND 
DECISIONS 71 (2013) (criticizing reporting of the effects of an offer to treat patients where the 
effects of actual treatment should be the parameter of interest); Angus Deaton, Instruments, 
Randomization, and Learning About Development, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 424, 429 (2010) (criticizing the 
use of instrumental variables where the availability of an instrument—rather than the research 
question—determines the parameter of interest). 
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standard errors216 or studies that predict reversals using multilevel hierar-
chical models and overdispersed logistic regression.217 Defining citation 
counts or reversal rates as objects of interest may create an illusion of 
credibility, but it does not bring empirical research any closer to providing 
useful information that can improve the legal system. 
There are many ways in which methodology can evolve to address ques-
tions unique to legal scholarship. In the following Sections, I briefly discuss 
two. First, because many meaningful legal phenomena cannot be objectively 
verified, empirical legal methodology will need to accommodate subjective 
phenomena. Second, because of the limitations of experimental approaches, 
legal empiricists will need to develop theories and methods that allow 
findings to generalize to diverse contexts. 
C.  Accommodating Subjective Phenomena 
The studies of citation counts, reversal rates, and interjudge disparities 
discussed in Parts II–IV were all motivated by values internal to law, such 
as good judging and correctness. Such values have two important features in 
common: they are abstract and subjective. One can verify the contents of 
legal texts and judicial opinions, but the correctness of legal decisions and 
the quality of judicial reasoning will inevitably be disputed. 
Many methodological approaches in empirical social science seek to 
avoid consideration of abstract concepts.218 Although there are many 
advantages to concreteness in empirical research, such an approach is not 
always appropriate for addressing normative questions about law. Because 
many of the important normative goals are inherently subjective, any 
methodological approach that limits its focus to objectively measurable 
phenomena will have nothing to say about these goals. As Pound argued to 
Llewellyn, 
Those who long for an exact science analogous to mathematics or physics or 
astronomy have been inclined to seek exactness by excluding [the question 
of how justice ought to be administered] from jurisprudence altogether. But 
 
216 See Choi et al., supra note 24, at 515-16 (examining the relationship between a judge’s 
gender and citation counts). 
217 See, e.g., Gelman et al., supra note 124 (studying death sentence reversals). 
218 See, e.g., GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 109 (1994) (urging empirical social scientists to “maximize concrete-
ness” and to “choose observable, rather than unobservable, concepts whenever possible”); id. at 111 
(“If we have no alternative to using unobservable constructs . . . then we should at least choose 
ideas with observable consequences.”). 
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such a jurisprudence has only an illusion of reality. For the significant ques-
tion is the one excluded.219 
There can be no “exact science” of law. The legal empiricist’s goal 
should not be to generate objective, assumption-free conclusions; there are 
few such conclusions that matter. Rather, legal empiricists need to find 
ways to combine objective findings with unverifiable assumptions to 
generate conclusions that are meaningful—at least according to some 
viewpoints—and to be explicit about how the assumptions are driving the 
results. 
D.  Emphasizing Generalizable Results 
Empirical research examines what occurred in the past, but policymak-
ing addresses what ought to be done in the future. To be relevant to 
normative questions, empirical research cannot merely explain what hap-
pened in the past, but must also interpret findings in ways that can inform 
decisions going forward. The normative goals of a research project will 
determine the extent to which the findings must be generalized to other 
contexts, which in turn will drive the study design. 
Extrapolation may be unnecessary in a few instances, such as in research 
that examines purely historical questions. A study that sought to determine 
the authorship of the disputed Federalist Papers,220 for example, had clear 
relevance to legal scholarship without any need to generalize the findings to 
other contexts. In other settings, what ought to be done in the future may 
depend directly on what happened in the past. In litigation, for example, 
whether the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury may directly determine 
whether the court ought to hold the defendant liable. To the extent that 
empirical research can shed light on such causal questions, it can provide 
direct guidance to legal decisionmakers without any need for generalizabil-
ity. 
Sometimes, extrapolating from the past to the future may be straight-
forward. If a drug proved effective in a well-controlled clinical trial, for 
instance, one might reasonably expect that it will have a similar effect in a 
comparable population in the future. In this setting, a simple comparison of 
the average effect on the treatment and control groups might be sufficient to 
determine whether the drug ought to be prescribed in the future. 
 
219 Pound, supra note 6, at 703. 
220 See Frederick Mosteller & David L. Wallace, Inference in an Authorship Problem, 302 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 275 (1963). 
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Even this simple example, however, relies on several critical assump-
tions. First, it assumes that the impact of the medical treatment does not 
vary over time, so that the effect observed in the past accurately predicts the 
effect that will occur in the future. This may seem self-evident in the 
context of many medical trials, but it is less obvious in field research in law 
and the social sciences. Second, the example assumes that it was feasible to 
conduct a well-controlled trial with a study population that was representa-
tive of the target population. Third, it assumes that the measureable 
outcome has direct normative significance, so that a comparison of out-
comes would provide sufficient information to guide policy. Fourth, it 
assumes that for normative purposes, we are only interested in the average 
effect of the treatment, and not any distributional effects.221  
When these assumptions are satisfied, there is little concern about 
whether the results are generalizable, and researchers should design studies 
to have high internal validity.222 When the assumptions do not hold, 
however, it is necessary to use research designs that provide both internal 
and external validity.223 This necessarily requires making assumptions about 
how the results can be extrapolated.224  
Many methodological differences among the disciplines stem from the 
plausibility of the above assumptions as applied to research questions within 
the respective disciplines. Some statisticians and social scientists have empha-
sized internal validity over external validity,225 while many econometricians 
 
221 See James J. Heckman, The Scientific Model of Causality, 35 SOC. METHODOLOGY 1, 20-21 
(2005) (noting that standard statistical approaches that rely on randomization only estimate 
average treatment effects, and not distributional effects). Experimental studies can examine 
whether average effects vary among identifiable groups, but this would only capture part of the 
overall distributional impact. 
222 A study design has “internal validity” if it “successfully uncovers causal effects for the 
population being studied.” JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARM-
LESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 151 (2009). 
223 A study design has “external validity” if the findings have predictive value in other con-
texts. See id. 
224 See MANSKI, supra note 215, at 30-31 (describing the need for assumptions in extrapolat-
ing empirical findings and criticizing researchers who use untenable assumptions); Christopher A. 
Sims, But Economics Is Not an Experimental Science, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 59, 60 (2010) (“We are 
always combining the objective information in the data with judgment, opinion and/or prejudice 
to reach conclusions.”). 
225 See, e.g., PAUL R. ROSENBAUM, DESIGN OF OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 56-57 (2010) 
(“The common view, which I share, is that internal validity comes first.” (endnote omitted)); 
Donald T. Campbell, Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings, 54 PSYCH. 
BULL. 297, 310 (1957) (“If one is in a situation where either internal validity or representativeness 
must be sacrificed, which should it be? The answer is clear. Internal validity is the prior and 
indispensable consideration.”). 
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have argued that both are essential.226 Many economists insist that empiri-
cal findings must be interpreted in the context of a theoretical framework,227 
while some statisticians advocate reporting facts with minimal interpreta-
tion.228 Much of the difference in perspectives stems from the fact that 
economics is primarily an observational science, while statistics is more 
oriented toward an experimental paradigm.229 In medical research, treat-
ments are typically tested in controlled trials and results may be easily 
extrapolated to other contexts. In such settings, simple comparisons be-
tween control and treatment groups may suffice. By contrast, economists 
are more often interested in forecasting the effects of policy interventions 
that cannot be implemented in advance,230 which requires models than can 
predict what will happen under untestable counterfactuals.  
The nature of theory required for extrapolating findings also varies by 
context. Toxicologists, for example, sometimes need to estimate the impact 
of exposure to minuscule amounts of environmental pollutants. When the 
impacts of such exposure are too small to be reliably measured in a con-
trolled trial or an observational study, scientists and policymakers must 
 
226 See, e.g., MANSKI, supra note 215, at 37 (arguing that both internal and external validity 
are important goals of research design); Deaton, supra note 215, at 447-52 (same); Heckman, supra 
note 221, at 8 (same). 
227 See Heckman, supra note 221, at 5 (“Blind empiricism unguided by a theoretical frame-
work for interpreting facts leads nowhere.”); Tjalling C. Koopmans, Measurement Without Theory, 
29 REV. ECON. & STAT. 161, 162 (1947) (advocating “[f]uller utilization of the concepts and 
hypotheses of economic theory . . . as a part of the processes of observation and measurement”). 
228 See A.P. Dawid, Causal Inference Without Counterfactuals, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 407, 407 
(2000) (“Nature is surely utterly indifferent to our attempts to ensnare her in our theories.”). 
229 See Guido W. Imbens, An Economist’s Perspective on Shadish (2010) and West and Tho-
emmes (2010), 15 PSYCHOL. METHODS 47, 48 (2010) (“Unlike biostatisticians, who often start 
from the perspective of a randomized clinical trial, economists start with the notion that individu-
als receive the treatments they received because they choose to.”); Guido W. Imbens & Jeffrey 
Wooldridge, Recent Developments in the Econometrics of Program Evaluation, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 19-
20 (2009) (noting that in biostatistics, randomized experiments “are often viewed as the only 
credible approach to establishing causality,” but that randomization “has played a much less 
prominent role” in economics and has “rarely been viewed as the sole method for establishing 
causality”); Sims, supra note 224, at 59 (“[E]conomics is not an experimental science and cannot 
be.”). Nonetheless, many economists have been moving toward the experimental paradigm, and 
the use of laboratory and field experiments has grown dramatically in recent years. See ANGRIST 
& PISCHKE, supra note 222, at 12 (noting a trend toward randomized experimentation beginning 
in the 1980s). 
230 See Heckman, supra note 221, at 17 (“Forecasting the effects of new policies is a central 
task of science and public policy analysis that the treatment effect literature ignores.”); Imbens, 
supra note 229, at 48 (noting that economists often ask causal questions regarding the effects of 
novel treatments); Aviv Nevo & Michael D. Whinston, Taking the Dogma Out of Econometrics: 
Structural Modeling and Credible Inference, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 71 (2010) (advocating the use of 
structural modeling to “provide a way to extrapolate observed responses to environmental changes 
to predict responses to other not-yet-observed changes”). 
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extrapolate from studies involving higher degrees of exposure. Often, the 
assumption is simply that there is a linear relationship between exposure to 
the pollutant and the likelihood of adverse health outcomes.231 Here, the 
marginal effect of the pollutant is assumed to be constant within some 
relevant range, so that a measured marginal effect from one study is asserted 
to generalize to lower levels of exposure. 
By contrast, economists often need more complex models to credibly 
extrapolate empirical findings to new contexts. Economists evaluating a 
proposed merger, for example, cannot feasibly test the effects of the merger 
using a controlled experiment. They could estimate the effects of past 
mergers, but such estimates may not reliably predict the effect of a future 
merger because firms have unique characteristics and industries are continu-
ally in flux.232 Econometric studies of past data may reveal the structure of 
supply and demand in various markets, but economists must also rely on 
economic theory and game theoretic models of firm competition to predict 
how the proposed merger would affect the future behavior of firms and 
consumers.233  
Recently, many scholars have advocated greater use of randomized trials 
in empirical legal research,234 and some have conducted innovative field 
experiments that randomize legal representation235 and law enforcement.236 
 
231 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
164 (2002) (describing a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency to assume a linear 
relationship between arsenic exposure and cancer rates and arguing that the “assumption of 
linearity is not based on science . . ., but on a policy judgment, designed to err on the side of 
protecting health”); Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky 
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 341-45 (1994) (arguing that the 
assumption of a linear relationship between exposure to carcinogens and cancer rates has a strong 
scientific basis). 
232 See Nevo & Whinston, supra note 230, at 73-75 (describing the difficulties of using the 
causal effects of past mergers to predict the impact of future mergers). 
233 See id. at 75 (describing the use of economic models to predict the impact of mergers). 
234 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (2011) 
(arguing that policymakers and governments should test laws and regulations with randomized 
trials); D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal 
Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2127 
(2012) (“[R]andomized trials . . . can provide credible answers on a far wider range of questions 
than is currently appreciated.”); D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: 
A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
901, 956 (2013) (“We believe such direct, randomized comparisons should be pursued, as they 
represent a powerful way to assess whether judicial best practices change case outcomes, litigant 
perceptions, and other outcomes of import.”). 
235 See, e.g., W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: 
A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 49-51 (1972) (describing 
the study design for a randomized trial measuring the impact of counsel in juvenile hearings); 
Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 234 (using randomization to evaluate the effects of an offer of 
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Although such experiments have the potential to offer credible estimates of 
the effects of various interventions, there are serious practical and ethical 
constraints on intentional randomization in the legal process.237 These 
constraints are most acute for studies of adjudication, where randomization 
would be in deep tension with the need for reasoned decisionmaking.238 
Some studies exploit naturally occurring sources of randomness within the 
legal system,239 but because natural experiments are not designed with 
research objectives in mind, scholars must exercise judgment in extrapolating 
the results to policy questions of interest. Even the most careful randomized 
 
legal representation from a law school clinic on outcomes in hearings for unemployment benefits); 
Greiner et al., supra note 234 (using randomization to evaluate the effects of an offer of legal 
representation in housing cases); Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for 
Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 419 (2001) (using randomization to evaluate a legal assistance program for low-income 
tenants in New York City). 
236 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for 
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984) (randomizing arrests of domestic violence suspects 
to estimate the impact of arrest on recidivism). 
237 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW: REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 25-
30 (1981) (cataloging ethical issues inherent in randomizing legal experiments); Phyllis Jo 
Baunach, Random Assignment in Criminal Justice Research: Some Ethical and Legal Issues, 17 CRIMI-
NOLOGY 435 (1980) (discussing ethical and legal concerns, such as arbitrary assignment and 
potential denial of benefits); Edna Erez, Randomized Experiments in Correctional Context: Legal, 
Ethical, and Practical Concerns, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 389, 391-92 (1986) (surveying ethical issues 
associated with random assignment in criminal justice studies); Pascoe Pleasence, Trials and 
Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-legal Setting, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 8, 24-26 
(2008) (discussing several ethical concerns of random control trials, such as the denial of benefits 
and compulsory participation); see also Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 234, at 2127-32 (arguing 
that legal ethics permits randomization of an offer of legal representation but not randomization of 
the actual use of representation).  
238 Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1984) (describing condemnation of a 
judge who flipped a coin to determine a defendant’s sentence); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization 
in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (“[J]udges strongly condemn randomization 
for their own merits decisions.”). 
239 See David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case As-
signment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145 (2007) (exploiting the random 
assignment of public defenders in felony cases to estimate the impact of attorney performance); 
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of 
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (exploiting the random 
assignment of defense attorneys to assess the performance of public defenders relative to 
appointed counsel in murder cases); Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge 
Assignments to Estimate the Effects of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 
48 CRIMINOLOGY 357 (2010); Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 
AM. ECON. REV. 863, 865-66 (2006) (exploiting the random assignment of judges to estimate the 
impact of incarceration on subsequent labor market outcomes); see also supra notes 156-158 and 
accompanying text (describing studies that examine the impact of randomly assigned judges on 
case outcomes). 
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trials can be compromised by subject attrition,240 crossover between the 
treatment and control groups,241 spillover effects,242 or even conscious 
efforts by nonparticipants to undermine the research.243 As Angus Deaton 
writes, 
[C]onducting good [randomized controlled trials] is exacting and often ex-
pensive, so that problems often arise that need to be dealt with by various 
econometric or statistical fixes. There is nothing wrong with such fixes in 
principle . . . but their application takes us out of the world of ideal [ran-
domized controlled trials] and back into the world of everyday econometrics 
and statistics.244  
The use of randomized trials is a welcome development in empirical 
legal scholarship, but many important research questions cannot be resolved 
with standard experimental methods. To address such questions, there is no 
alternative but to rely on theory, contestable assumptions, and empirical 
estimates that can be extrapolated from other contexts.  
For example, it would be difficult to estimate the effects of proposed 
sentencing guidelines through a randomized trial. One could examine past 
changes in sentencing guidelines, but this would not necessarily predict the 
impact of future guidelines; the guidelines at issue might not be identical, 
the composition of the judiciary would have changed, and mandatory 
minimum penalties might be different. Any effort to predict the effect of 
future policies would require a model of judicial sentencing behavior that 
enables results from prior studies to be generalized to new contexts.  
 
240 See Abramowicz et al., supra note 234, at 957-59 (noting that attrition “may bias experi-
mental results when the attrition rate depends on selection for treatment”). 
241 See id. at 959-60 (discussing the problems related to crossover, such as those that occur 
“if well-connected people . . . thwart random assignment.”). 
242 See id. at 960 (discussing how a controlled trial can be contaminated by spillover effects if 
the control group is also influenced by the treatment); Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: 
Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities, 72 ECONO-
METRICA 159, 160 (2004) (“[I]f externalities benefit the comparison group, outcome differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups will understate the benefits of treatment on the 
treated.”). 
243 See Richard D. Schwartz, Foreword to STAPLETON & TEITELBAUM, supra note 235, at xii 
(noting judicial opposition to Stapleton and Teitelbaum’s randomized study of representation in 
juvenile delinquency hearings); Dave Hoffman, Experiments in Lawyering: Does the Harvard Legal 
Aid Bureau Deserve a Merit Badge?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Dec. 21, 2010), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2010/12/experiments-in-lawyering-does-the-harvard-legal-aid-clinic-deserves-a-merit-
badge.html (describing how a legal services organization stopped referring clients to Harvard 
Legal Aid Bureau due to the Bureau’s participation in a randomized trial). 
244 Deaton, supra note 215, at 447. 
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In addition, as I have emphasized throughout this Article, the measure-
able outcomes in empirical legal research often do not have direct normative 
significance. Although a randomized trial can provide a credible estimate of 
the average effect of an intervention, this estimate may not be meaningful if 
the underlying outcome variable lacks normative significance. Finally, legal 
scholars are not merely interested in the average effects of treatments, but 
also distributional effects; the degree to which likes are treated alike245, for 
example, cannot be assessed by estimating the average effect of any legal 
policy.246  
The diverse research questions in empirical legal scholarship will almost 
certainly require diverse methods. Simple methods may be most appropri-
ate in some settings and more technical approaches in others. But the 
methods used in empirical legal scholarship should be determined by 
substantive research questions, not the other way around.  
CONCLUSION 
Pound and Llewellyn shared a worthy goal: using empirical social sci-
ence to improve the law. Both understood that social scientists must engage 
with values in order to advance legal reform. They disagreed sharply about 
values, but at least they were debating the right questions. 
The legal realists and sociological jurists never succeeded in establishing 
empirical research within the mainstream of legal scholarship. Now, con-
temporary scholars are bringing new energy to the empirical study of the 
legal system. They have been steadily improving in methodological sophis-
tication, but in the process, they have lost much of their connection with 
law’s normativity. All too often, research into what is fails to inform debates 
about what ought to be. 
This Article has argued that empirical legal scholars must clarify the 
normative issues at stake in their research and be more explicit about the 
asserted connections between measurable data and normative claims. Doing 
this well will require careful thinking about the questions that animate 
empirical legal research and the development of new frameworks and 
methods that can provide meaningful answers. This is no doubt a challeng-
ing task. But if empirical studies lose sight of the goals of legal scholarship, 
what will the counting be good for? 
 
 
245 See supra Section IV.B. 
246 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
